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INTRODUCTION
T HREE years ago, no one had heard of Napster or Gnutella.
Over the past few years, however, Napster and Gnutella, along
with their subsequent imitators, have grown into arguably the larg-
est international networks of illegality in human history. At its
peak Napster had approximately 70 million users,' the overwhelm-
ing majority of whom used the service to obtain unlicensed copies
of copyrighted sound recordings by swapping music files with other
users.2 Although adverse court decisions eventually brought Nap-
ster to its knees, file-swapping users have simply taken their "busi-
ness" elsewhere, and a plethora of file-swapping networks, includ-
ing Gnutella, have taken Napster's place. By 2002, another
application, Kazaa, had twice as many users as Napster had at its
peak.' According to a recent estimate, as many as 40 million
Americans use a peer-to-peer network to obtain copyrighted con-
tent every week.'
There is something else happening with these networks besides
the widespread copyright infringement they encourage, and it may
be even more interesting. After all, there is little mystery as to why
'Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience Fans Out, N.Y. Times, July 20,
2001, at Al; Kelly Zito, Online Music Firm Settles Lawsuit with Publishers, S.F.
Chron., Sept. 25, 2001, at C1.
2A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902-03 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
("The evidence shows that virtually all Napster users download or upload copyrighted
files and that the vast majority of the music available on Napster is copyrighted.").
'Amy Harmon, Gazing into 2003: Economy Intrudes on Dreams of New Services-
Music Attracting Consumers to the Online Jukebox, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2002, at C3;
see also Gwendolyn Mariano, Napster Rivals Winning Popularity Contest, ZDNet
Austi., at http://www.zdnet.com.au/printfriendly?AT=2000024981-20261702 (Nov. 6,
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (noting that the Ka-
zaa/Grokster network was predicted to have passed Napster in terms of number of
simultaneous user; by November of 2001); Richard Menta, RIAA and MPAA Sue
Morpheus, Grokster, and KaZaa, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/
sue-morpheus.html (Oct. 3, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association)
("According to WebNoize, 3.05 billion files were downloaded in August via the lead-
in Napster clones. At its peak last February Napster delivered 2.79 billion files.").
Doug Bedell, Pay to Play? No Way: New Legislation, Record Labels Are Going
After File-Sharing Networks, San Diego Union Trib., July 29, 2002, at E3 (citing a re-
cent study by the San Francisco research firm Odyssey).
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tens of millions of individuals have chosen to use these networks to
download free, high-quality sound recordings. The more puzzling
question is why tens of millions of individuals have chosen to up-
load free, high-quality sound recordings to their fellow anonymous
users. Downloading content from a peer-to-peer network depends
entirely on another user's willingness to upload such content.
While users of these networks have been free to download as much
content as they want without ever having to share their content, a
substantial number of users still elected to share. Seen in this light,
the file-swapping networks are a triumph of cooperation, and a
shining beacon of kindness to strangers.
In this Article, I will provide an explanation for why so many
Internet users make their unlicensed copies of copyrighted content
available to perfect strangers despite the absence of obvious incen-
tives for doing so. Drawing on the social psychological literature
that explores cooperation and altruism in the face of anonymity, I
will propose that file-swappers share their content with anonymous
strangers mainly because "charismatic" technologies make the
community of file-swappers appear to its users far more coopera-
tive than it really is. In so doing, the networks tap into deeply held
social norms of reciprocity that people develop offline and bring
with them to cyberspace. I will then use the file-swapping networks
as a case study for analyzing how cooperation and social norms
emerge in an environment characterized by anonymity and a lack
of repeat-player interactions. In short, I will present a hypothesis to
explain the emergence of social norms in a "loose-knit" environ-
ment.5
As this account suggests, robust, cooperation-encouraging social
norms can emerge where anonymity is widespread, provided the
environment in which the anonymous individuals interact is prop-
'Close-knit environments are those in which repeat players can identify each other.
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
177-78 (1991) ("A group is close-knit when informal power is broadly distributed
among group members and the information pertinent to informal control circulates
easily among them."). Loose-knit groups, by contrast, are clusters of individuals who
are unlikely to be repeat players, or are otherwise unlikely to be able to identify each
other in repeat interactions. While the legal literature on close-knit groups is well-
developed, the literature on loose-knit groups is not. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, So-
cial Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359
(2003).
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erly structured. I will propose that, in this instance, the ingenious
structures of the file-swapping networks solidify a norm of sharing,
and that this norm of sharing is reinforced by users' notions of re-
ciprocity. If my account is correct, it suggests that rather than mov-
ing sequentially against the various post-Napster networks, the
copyright industries should have helped create a norm of free-
riding on the peer-to-peer networks. In so doing, copyright holders
might have curtailed the cooperative uploading on which these
networks rely. I will consider this and other alternative strategies
for preventing copyright infringement in the final pages of this Ar-
ticle.
Part I of this Article will provide a technical, historical, and legal
introduction to the world of file-swapping on the Internet. This
Part will provide context so that the uninitiated may better under-
stand the nature of the social phenomenon being characterized in
the remainder of the Article. It will then explore the ways in which
users of these networks cooperate despite the apparent absence of
incentives to do so, and the limitations on cooperation that the
networks' designers have had to attempt to overcome.
Parts II and III will examine the emergence of two kinds of so-
cial norms that govern human behavior with respect to file-
swapping activities. The first of these, discussed in Part II, is the
norm that renders downloading behavior permissible regardless of
what the copyright laws might say. The emergence of this norm can
be explained plausibly through a standard economic analysis sup-
plemented by a traditional account of norm creation.
Part III will discuss a second norm-one that cannot be explained
through the existing tool set that social norms scholars have devel-
oped to analyze close-knit groups. This norm holds that those who
download content from peer-to-peer networks should also make con-
tent available to other users. This norm's emergence and survival can
be best explained by reference to the social psychological literature
that examines why people generally cooperate with or behave altruis-
tically toward strangers. The literature suggests that even in loose-knit
environments, individuals can be persuaded to cooperate if they view
others as cooperating. Using this framework, Part III will argue that
the file-swapping networks have been so successful in large part be-
cause they have created an online environment in which sharing ap-
pears to be far more prevalent than it really is. This phenomenon is
509
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emblematic of what I call "charismatic code"-a technology that
magnifies cooperative behavior and masks uncooperative behavior.
Part IV will apply some of the lessons gleaned from the forego-
ing discussion to the policy choices that courts, legislatures, and
private actors must confront in regulating file-swapping on the
Internet. It will suggest that courts and copyright holders may have
botched their initial efforts to respond to the challenge posed by
the file-swapping networks. This Part will then examine alternative
strategies that copyright holders could employ to weaken these
networks-specifically, self-help and pricing mechanisms that raise
the cost of user cooperation. An understanding of how social
norms arise and thrive in loose-knit environments suggests surpris-
ing strategies for undermining arguably pernicious cooperation by
file-swappers. To illustrate, I will suggest that the copyright indus-
tries may be able to undermine the success of file-swapping net-
works by releasing their own file-swapping programs that allow
people to exchange files, but that make uploading appear to be far
less prevalent than it really is-thereby undermining the norm of
sharing. Alternatively, I will argue that the record industry's well-
publicized strategy of uploading flawed MP3 files onto the peer-to-
peer networks is much more likely to succeed if done surrepti-
tiously, so that users begin to blame each other for the presence of
these files, prompting them to eschew future cooperation. Insights
about charismatic code therefore can be useful to those wishing to
control copyright infringement, but they might also be useful to
those who wish to strengthen the networks. To that end, Part IV
will suggest ways in which the networks could boost the levels of
cooperation that exist therein. A brief conclusion will follow.
I. AN INTRODUCrION TO NAPSTER, GNUTELLA,
AND THE FILE-SWAPPING HYBRIDS
The term "killer app" is software industry lingo for a must-have
application that profoundly alters the experience of using a com-
puter.' The explosive growth of the computer software industryduring the 1980s and 1990s was sparked by killer apps such as Lo-
6 See SearchWebServices.com, Definitions, Killer App, at http://searchwebservices.
techtarget.com/sDefinition/,,sid26_gci212442,00.html (last updated Oct. 30, 2002) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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tus 1,2,3 (a spreadsheet program), Wordperfect (a word processor
program), and Netscape (an Internet browser). It is safe to say that
during the year 2000 Napster became the killer app du jour.7
A. Napster
1. Napster in Brief
Napster was a file-swapping program created in 1999 by Shawn
Fanning, a Northeastern University undergraduate who wanted to
create a network that would allow him to trade MP3 music files8
with his friends over the Internet.9 Napster integrated two basic
functionalities: It compiled a searchable directory that allowed us-
ers to locate desired content on other users' machines and com-
bined that directory with a file transfer protocol, which allowed
that content to be copied from one computer to another.'0
Using Napster to exchange music files was straightforward: A
user directed his Internet browser to visit the Napster website and
downloaded Napster's MusicShare software." That software cata-
logued the music files in designated drives on a user's computer
and stored this catalog on Napster's central servers. The software
then permitted the user to search through the catalog of MP3 files
available on other users' computers and download desired files.
'See Clay Shirky, Listening to Napster, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of
a Disruptive Technology 21, 26 (Andy Oram ed., 2001) ("Whatever one thinks of
Napster's probable longevity, Napster is the killer app for this revolution."); Karl
Taro Greenfeld, Meet the Napster, Time, Oct. 2, 2000, at 60, 62 ("[Napster] already
ranks among the greatest Internet applications ever, up there with e-mail and instant
messaging. In terms of users, the Napster site is the fastest growing in history .... ");
see also Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (finding that Napster "has contributed to ille-
gal copying on a scale that is without precedent").
' MP3s are a form of compressed music files that produce near CD-quality sound at
a tenth the size of a WAV file, which was the prior standard software format for mu-
sic. Robert T. Baker, Finding a Winning Strategy Against the MP3 Invasion: Supple-
mental Measures the Recording Industry Must Take to Curb Online Piracy, 8 UCLA
Ent. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2000).
9Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1761,
1766 n.28 (2001).
'0 Expert Report of Professor Lawrence Lessig Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) at 48, A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000).
" Riehl, supra note 9, at 1768.
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These files were then transferred directly from the host user's
computer to the requester's computer via a peer-to-peer connec-
tion over the Internet.
12
Once a user logged in to the Napster network, she could locate
files for downloading in a couple of ways. Napster provided a
search function whereby a user could locate files in fellow users' di-
rectories after searching by artist name or song title. She could
then see not only which users had the files on their directories, but
also the speed of their respective Internet connections. After con-
ducting an initial search, the user had several search options. She
could search for another artist or song, or she could examine the
file directory of a particular user that showed files satisfying the
first search criteria to see what other files that user had made
available for downloading. 3 For example, a user interested in ex-
panding her jazz horizons might have searched for files containing
music by a well-known artist such as Miles Davis or Louis Arm-
strong and subsequently looked at the directories belonging to us-
ers who had extensive collections of Davis or Armstrong re-
cordings. In that way, users could find high-quality music by artists
who were previously unknown to them.
Napster users occasionally engaged in virtual conversations with
the users who were supplying them with music files. For example, a
user looking for music by a relatively obscure artist could find an-
other user with a substantial collection of that artist's works. The
user could begin to download the music and, at the same time,
page the uploading user to see if he was interested in exchanging
instant messages about the artist. Napster also hosted chat rooms
that involved many users simultaneously. 4 Napster thereby permit-
ted music lovers to share information and conversation with others
who had similar tastes.
2. Napster's Growth
A firm that monitors Internet usage reported that Napster was
the fastest spreading application ever tracked on the Internet.15 By
12 Id.
13 A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906-07 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
4 d. at 907.
"Amanda Lenhart & Susannah Fox, The Pew Internet & Am. Life Project,
Downloading Free Music: Internet Music Lovers Don't Think It's Stealing 4, at
512 [Vol. 89:505
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the summer of 2000, less than one year after the program's launch,
Napster use was widespread. Of the thirty-seven percent of Inter-
net users in the United States who had listened to or downloaded
music off the Internet, 6 fifty-four percent had used Napster to
download music. 7 A little more than half of Napster's 70 million
users were located in the United States, but significant user popula-
tions also existed in Canada, Australia, Brazil, Germany, and the
United Kingdom. 8
Napster fueled an unprecedented surge in music downloading
from the Internet. Between July of 2000 and February of 2001, the
number of Americans who had downloaded music off the Internet
increased by more than forty percent.'9 The majority of Americans
between the ages of twelve and twenty-nine with Internet access
had downloaded music files via the Internet." Napster users began
amassing increasingly larger collections of MP3 files. In April of
2000, the average file-sharing Napster user shared approximately
100 MP3 files.2
3. The Napster Litigation and Its Fallout
On December 6, 1999, several record labels sued Napster in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
for contributory and vicarious22 copyright infringement.23 The dis-
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=23 (Sept. 28, 2000) (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
16 Id. at 7.
"Id. at 11.
"Jupiter Media Metrix Reports Multi-Country Napster Usage Statistics for Febru-
ary 2001, PR Newswire, Apr. 5, 2001, available at LEXIS, Wire Service Stories File.
, Mike Graziano & Lee Rainie, The Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, The Music
Downloading Deluge: 37 Million American Adults and Youth Have Retrieved Music
Files on the Internet 2, at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=33
(Apr. 24, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).Id.
21 Id. at 3.
22 One who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or otherwise ma-
terially contributes to the infringing conduct of another is potentially liable for contribu-
tory copyright infringement. Vicarious liability arises when one party has direct control
over an infringer and benefits from that infringer's unlawful activities. See Aric Jacover,
Note, I Want My MP3! Creating a Legal and Practical Scheme to Combat Copyright In-
fringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications, 90 Geo. L.J. 2207,2221 (2002).
23A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6243, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000).
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trict court denied Napster's motion for summary judgment on May
5, 2000, rejecting the company's claims that its service fell within
the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act." On July 26, 2000, the district court essentially sided with the
record labels on the merits, granting their motion for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Napster from engaging in contributory and
vicarious infringement of the recording industry's copyrights. 5 The
district court enjoined Napster from "engaging in, or facilitating
others in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distrib-
uting plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions and sound re-
cordings... without express permission of the rights owner. 2 6 The
court placed the burden of removing access to copyrighted works
on Napster, but ordered the plaintiffs to assist Napster by identify-
ing the works in which they owned copyrights. 7 Shortly before the
injunction was to become effective, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit granted Napster's application for a stay
pending appeal. While the case was awaiting the Ninth Circuit's
review, the free publicity that Napster garnered through coverage
of the litigation helped Napster's user base grow dramatically. 9
On February 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's determination that Napster had likely engaged in contribu-
tory and vicarious copyright infringement.3" The court altered the
district court's injunction somewhat, finding the injunctive order
overbroad to the extent that it placed upon Napster the primary
onus to ensure that its network was free of copyrighted content.31
The court thought it more appropriate to "place the burden on
plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works and
files containing such works available on the Napster system before
Napster has the duty to disable access to the offending content. 3 2
24 17 U.S.C. § 512(a); Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *29-30.25A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 918-22, 927 & n.32 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
26 Id. at 927.
27 Id.
See id. at 927 n.32.29 John Alderman, Sonic Boom: Napster, MP3, and the New Pioneers of Music 143
(2001).
'0 A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
" Id. at 1027.32 Id.
[Vol. 89:505
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Three weeks later, the district court modified its injunction on
remand." The court required the plaintiffs to provide Napster with
a list of songs and names of artists whose copyrighted content was
being traded on Napster 4 The court further ordered Napster to be
diligent in preventing circumvention of the spirit of the court's in-junction through "variations of the filename(s), or of the spelling of
the titles or artists' names, of the works identified by the plain-
tiffs."35 Under the court's order, Napster had three days to prevent
a copyrighted file that the plaintiffs had identified from being
swapped via the network. 6 In order to comply with the injunction,
Napster installed "filtering" software on its servers to prevent cer-
tain copyrighted files from appearing when one user searched an-
other user's directory. 7 Moreover, Napster's search function was
rigged so that when a user typed in a search query such as "Rolling
Stones," the network immediately returned the response "No files
found." This injunction essentially killed Napster-by September
of 2002, Napster was no longer operating, had laid off virtually all
of its employees, and appeared headed for liquidation. 8
B. Gnutella
Approximately one year after Napster's creation, Gnutella, a
new file-swapping program, was released over the Internet. 9 Pres-
ently, there are several different Gnutella applications, all of which
use the same basic network and file-swapping technologies. The
most popular Gnutella applications when this Article went to press
were BearShare, Limewire, Qtraxmax, and XoloX.4 Although
their interfaces and features vary somewhat, all of these applica-
33A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2186 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001).
Id. at *3-4.
3' Id. at *5.
36 Id. at *6-7.
" See Ernest A. Jasmin, Crossing Swords with Pirates: Despite a Crackdown, Pirat-
ing Music Is More Common than Ever, News Trib. (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 6, 2002, at
D1.
3 Matt Richtel, Napster Says it Is Likely to Be Liquidated, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4,
2002, at C2.
" Gene Kan, Gnutella, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits of a Disruptive
Technology, supra note 7, at 94, 95; Riehl, supra note 9, at 1774.0 MP3 Search Tools, Download.com, at http://download.com/3150-2166-0-1-4.html?
(last visited Feb. 13, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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tions share the same network, meaning that a BearShare user can
exchange files with a Limewire user without difficulty.
1. Gnutella's Structure
Gnutella's network is more versatile than Napster's was in that it
allows users to exchange software files in any format, rather than
just MP3 files." Scanned photographs, text files, and motion pic-
tures can be exchanged over the Gnutella network. Not surpris-
ingly, the Gnutella network has become quite popular among users
who want to exchange copies of movies and pornographic images.
A user searching for software files on Gnutella does so in a
manner somewhat similar to searching on Napster."2 After logging
in to the Gnutella network, his computer connects to a number of
other computers running a Gnutella application. That user may
then type any search phrase into the software, be it an artist's
name, album title, song title, or some combination thereof. His
computer then asks the other computers to which it is connected
whether they contain files that match the search description. These
computers in turn query the computers to which they are con-
nected, and so on.43 Eventually, many of the computers connected
to a particular network (a maximum of 10,000 machines)4" will be
asked whether they have files that match the search query, and will
return any affirmative responses to the requesting computer.45 The
user is then able to sort the affirmative responses by variables such
as Internet connection speed or file size. Once the user requests to
download a particular file from a particular user, a peer-to-peer
connection between their computers is established via the Internet,
and the file is copied from the uploader to the downloader.
" For an excellent, detailed overview of Gnutella's history and an explanation of
how Gnutella works, see Kan, supra note 39, at 94-122.
"2 The text that follows is based on a description of BearShare, a popular application
for searching the Gnutella network. The user experience varies slightly on other
Gnutella applications.
" See Expert Report of Professor Lawrence Lessig Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) at 1 50-51, A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-
05183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000).
'4 See Kan, supra note 39, at 111; What Is Gnutella?, at http://www.gnutellanews.
com/information/what-is-gnutella.shtml (last visited July 1, 2001) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association).
45 What Is Gnutella?, supra note 44.
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Until somewhat recently, Gnutella did not permit a user to scan
the directory of another user to see all the files he had made avail-
able. In place of that handy Napster function, however, Gnutella
introduced a fascinating voyeurism tool entitled "Monitor." A
Gnutella user can observe, at any given time, a scrolling list of que-
ries that other users have recently entered into their Gnutella
search engines. Such searches reveal the eclectic tastes of
Gnutella's users" and often inspire users to duplicate a particular
search.
Unlike Napster's software, the Gnutella network does not rely
on a central server to store a directory of the files available on us-
ers' systems." Rather, all the computers plugged into the network
function as mini-servers. In an era when lawsuits and injunctions
are the primary tools for preventing copyright infringement on the
Internet, this decentralized structure makes it relatively difficult to
police (and ultimately shut down) Gnutella.4" Indeed, Gnutella's
creators bill their program and network as one that is impervious
to legal control.
Gnutella can withstand a band of hungry lawyers. How many
realtime search technologies can claim that? Not Napster, that's
for sure. Just to emphasize how revolutionary this is: hungry law-
yers are probably more destructive than nuclear weapons. There
are a few things that will prevent Gnutella from being stopped by
lawyers, FBI, etc. First, Gnutella is nothing but a protocol. It's
just freely-accessible information. There is no company to sue.
No one entity is really responsible for Gnutella. Second, Gnutella
is not there to promote the piracy of music. It's a technology, not
a music-piracy tool. The important thing is that Gnutella will be
46For example, a random search I conducted on August 4, 2001 revealed that users
were searching for popular music ("matchbox 20," "Michael Jackson," "Cypress
Hill," and "Classic Rock"), motion pictures ("Top Gun," "The Exorcist," "Sleepy
Hollow," and "Enemy at the Gates"), computer software applications ("Easy CD
Creator 5"), and pornography ("Kiddie mpg," "Girls Gone Wild," and "Barely Legal
6").
, Tim Wu, Compliance & Code: Is Peer-to-Peer Really a Challenge to Law?, 89 Va.
L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2003) (manuscript at 21, on file with the Virginia Law Re-
view Association).
48See Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 Duke L.J.
1045, 1068-69 (2001).
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here tomorrow. It's reliable, it's sharing terabytes of data, and it
is absolutely unstoppable. 9
This rhetoric may be overblown and unsophisticated, but neither
lawyers nor server failures have been able to bring down Gnutella
since its birth.5' Faced with the unattractive prospect of filing indi-
vidual lawsuits against the many copyright-infringing users on
Gnutella's networks, the music and motion picture industries ini-
tially held their fire against Gnutella's developers and users." Not
surprisingly, Gnutella's creators have exhibited a disdain for capi-
talism in general and intellectual property rights in particular.52
, What Is Gnutella?, supra note 44.
As Damien Riehl explains:
Traditionally, copyright holders have been able to sue questionably infringing
sites because the companies are identifiable, have a physical presence in a juris-
diction, and can be found on a machine in a specific geographic location ....
Those considering legal action against Gnutella, however, would not have the
luxury of an easy target to sue, since the infringers and their computers may be
located around the world and could number in the millions. Since there is no
one company behind Gnutella, but it is only a loose-knit group of individuals
who often participate in non-commercial file exchanges, copyright holders are
left without any significant coffers to sue and some nearly insurmountable ju-
risdictional hurdles to overcome. Furthermore, any attempt by entertainment
industry copyright holders would likely be a legal and public relations night-
mare. The minimal damages that could be recovered from infringing users
would not justify the cost and time involved in attempting to assert jurisdiction
against millions of individuals in a myriad of jurisdictions.
Riehl, supra note 9, at 1778-79; see also Jon Healey, Gnutella Targeted for Piracy
Control, L.A. Times, Mar. 29, 2001, at C5 (discussing the legal difficulties faced by the
RIAA if it wishes to shut down Gnutella).
" John Borland, RIAA: Gnutella not yet a Threat, News.com, at http://news.com.com/
2102-1023-255005.html (Mar. 29, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Associa-
tion). In 2003, the music industry changed tactics. See Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am.
v. Verizon Internet Servs., Civil Action 02-MS-0323 (JDB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
681 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2003) (holding that Verizon must supply to the Recording Indus-
try Association of America the identity of anonymous users of its Internet service
who have allegedly violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998); Alan
Goldstein, Tune-Swapping Issue Gets Personal, Dallas Morning News, Jan. 29, 2003,
at 1D ("A federal court ruling last week grants entertainment companies the right to
unmask the identities of subscribers suspected of swapping unauthorized music over
peer-to-peer file sharing services.").
52 See Alderman, supra note 29, at 148-49.
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2. Gnutella's Growth
In part because it was initially less user-friendly and efficient
than Napster, in part because of Napster's first-mover advantage in
the marketplace, and in part because of less aggressive marketing,
Gnutella's file-swapping network did not catch on nearly as quickly
as Napster's. Gnutella usage received a major boost, however, after
the Ninth Circuit ordered Napster to start complying with copy-
right laws. Indeed, Internet watchers reported a seventeen percent
increase in Gnutella usage on the day after the Napster decision
was handed down.53 That trend continued as Napster began making
it more difficult for users to access copyrighted MP3 files. 4 As
Napster users began to anticipate the eventual demise of Napster
as they knew it, they, and new file-swappers, increasingly began us-
ing Gnutella as a Napster substitute."5
C. File-Swapping Hybrids
In the past two years, a number of hybrid software programs,
such as MusicCity's Morpheus, Kazaa, and Audiogalaxy Satellite,
have been distributed over the Internet. These programs combine
Napster's efficient downloading with Gnutella's decentralized
structure and support of many different file formats. Several of
these networks, such as the one that serves Kazaa and Grokster
" Victory or Defeat?, Salon.com, at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/02/12/
napsterreactions/print.html (Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review As-
sociation) (quoting Kelly Truelove, CEO of Clip2); see also Janelle Brown, The Mu-
sic Revolution Will not Be Digitized, Salon.com, at http://archive.salon.com/tech/
feature/2001/06/01/digital-music/print.html (June 1, 2001) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association) (discussing the spike in Gnutella usage after the Napster
decision).
" See Richtel, supra note 1 ("Figures to be released today show that a precipitous drop
in Napster's traffic over the last several weeks has been paralleled by marked growth in
more than half a dozen less centralized services."); Ron Harris, Napster: Company Is Not
Dead, at http://gareth.membrane.com/news/mp3news/mp3050301.html (May 3, 2001) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association); Napster Use Slumps as Screening Tech-
nology Takes Hold, at http://gareth.membrane.com/news/mp3news/mp3031601.html (Mar.
16,2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
" See Baker, supra note 8, at 17; Elaine O'Connor, Who Needs Napster? Peer-to-
Peer Sharing Thrives: Record Companies Have Shut Down the Best-Known Site, but
Music 'Sharing' Continues to Grow, Ottawa Citizen, Aug. 17, 2002, at J1.
56 In February of 2002, Morpheus switched over from the network that it shared
with users of Kazaa and Grokster to the Gnutella network. Farhad Manjoo, Sour
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are operated by companies based outside the United States.57 The
file-swapping hybrids generally "scale" better than Gnutella does,
which means that when a user logs in to the network, he is able to
access the content hosted by a larger number of users and, accord-
ingly, has a larger library of files from which to choose. 8 Moreover,
whereas Gnutella servers use every computer on the network as a
mini-server to facilitate searching, hybrid applications automati-
cally locate the most powerful computers on the network with the
highest speed connections and use only those computers as mini-
servers. The result is a noticeably faster network and a more effi-
cient process for searching."
While the Gnutella network has gained significant traffic in the
wake of Napster's downfall, the file-swapping hybrids have been
the primary beneficiaries." During a single week in August of 2001,
2.8 million people downloaded the three most popular hybrid ap-
plications.' Although it is difficult to gauge the precise number of
users on these networks, the two most popular, Kazaa and Music-
City's Morpheus, have been downloaded more than 300 million
times between them, and the next four most popular, iMesh,
Audiogalaxy Satellite, BearShare, and Limewire, account for an
Notes, Salon.com, at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/07/30/file-trading/
print.html (July 30, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
" Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., No. CIV.A.01-08541, 2003 WL
186657, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2003) (noting that Kazaa's parent company is organ-
ized under the laws of Vanuatu, with its principal place of business in Australia).
58 See Michael Miller, Discovering P2P 165 (2001); Wu, supra note 47 (manuscript at
36). For further discussions of scalability, see also Steve McCannell, The Second
Coming of Gnutella, at http://www.webreview.com/mmedia/2001/030201.shtml
(Mar. 2, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discussing
Gnutella's scalability problems); Erick Schonfeld, Goodbye Napster, Hello Mor-
pheus, ZDNet, at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-861914.html (Mar. 18, 2002) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discussing the scalability of hybrids).
5' See Wu, supra note 47 (manuscript at 36).
6°See Mark Lewis, Does Morpheus' Architecture Save MusicCity from Legal
Liability?, at http://news.webnoize.com/item.rs?ID=13863 (Aug. 23, 2001) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (noting that use of the combined
Morpheus, Kazaa, and Grokster networks grew by eighty-nine percent in June, and
that by August there were more than 700,000 users on the network simultaneously);
Farhad Manjoo, Gnutella Bandwidth Bandits, Salon.com, at http://archive.salon.com/
tech/feature/2002/08/08/gnutella-developers/ (Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
6 These statistics are updated weekly at Download.com. See http://download.com
(last visited Apr. 2, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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additional 111 million downloads. 2 These numbers are rendered
particularly important by the network externalities that exist on the
file-swapping networks; the more users a network has, the more
content generally will be available, and as a result, the more attrac-
tive the network will become to new members.63
The music and motion picture industries have recently begun to
pursue legal actions against the creators of these hybrid sites.'
Some of these actions have been successful, such as the Recording
Industry Association of America's ("RIAA"'s) copyright in-
fringement lawsuit against AudioGalaxy, and the subsequent set-
tlement that required AudioGalaxy to block users from swapping
the vast majority of the songs that would otherwise be available
over the network.65 Despite these court victories, Congressman
Henry Waxman, a recording industry stalwart, recently offered the
following assessment of the hybrids and Gnutella: "[K]illing Nap-
ster created problems of even greater magnitude."66
D. Cooperative Behavior on Napster, Gnutella, and the Hybrids
In order to describe user conduct on the peer-to-peer networks
precisely, it is necessary to deviate somewhat from the vocabulary
62 According to Download.com, as of April 2, 2003, Kazaa had been downloaded
209,618,921 times, Morpheus 110,323,729 times, iMesh 46,767,579 times, Audiogalaxy
31,362,750 times, BearShare 18,185,931 times, and LimeWire 15,273,726 times. MP3
Search Tools, Download.com, at http://download.com.com/3150-2166-0-1-4.html? (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). There is certainly
overlap among downloaders, since some users may have experimented with several
different applications. Some users may have downloaded the same applications more
than once because of installation difficulties. Still, a conservative estimate extrapolat-
ing from this data suggests that at least 100 million computer users have experimented
with file-swapping applications.
63 Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1257, 1281-84 (1998); Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks 9-16 (Sept. 10,
2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
See Jane Black, Napster's Sons: Singing a Different Tune?, Bus. Wk. Online, at
http://www.businessweek.comIbwdaily/dnflash/feb2002/nf20020221_6377.htm (Feb. 21,
2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
65 See Eliot Van Buskirk, File Sharing After Audiogalaxy, MP3 Insider, at
http://electronics.cnet.com/electronics/0-321.9397-8-20067407-1.html (June 21, 2002)
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
' See John Snell, What Napster has Spawned; Porn Pervasive on Successors; Also
Viruses, Spyware, Seattle Times, Feb. 24, 2003, at C3 (quoting Congressman Wax-
man).
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of network users. Members of the networks themselves refer to
participation in the networks as "file-sharing" or "file-swapping."
They use these two phrases interchangeably. In this Article, I use
the phrases to mean different things, and these divergent meanings
will become quite important in the text that follows. I refer to "file-
sharing" as making one's files available for others to download
(that is, making at least some of the media files on one's hard drive
available to members of the network). By contrast, I use "file-
swapping" to refer to general participation in the network, whether
as a downloader, an uploader, or both.67
In the few years since the file-swapping applications were cre-
ated, several behavioral trends have remained constant. These
trends have been observable on Napster, Gnutella, and the hy-
brids. First, file-sharing, although entirely optional, is sufficiently
common to cause the network to function efficiently.68 Second, the
material available for downloading is generally of high quality and
accurately labeled. Third, transmission disruptions are relatively
common. Each phenomenon is worthy of further attention.
67 Thus, based on the definitions above, someone who downloads files from others
but does not upload any files is a file-swapper but not a file-sharer. Someone who
both uploads and downloads files is a file-swapper and a file-sharer.
' It is surprising that all of the major file-swapping networks have relied on norms
to encourage uploading rather than enforcing hard and fast rules requiring uploading.
More precisely, it would be possible for programmers to design a file-swapping net-
work that allowed users to download ten files for free and subsequently required us-
ers to upload one file for every five files they downloaded. Why has no successful sys-
tem adopted this strategy? Part of the explanation may be that tracking individual
users' uploading-to-downloading ratios requires storage of such information, and stor-
age of such information potentially makes it available to subpoena by copyright
holders, which could then target the most active uploaders for legal action. By the
same token, requiring their users to upload might make the peer-to-peer networks
more plainly guilty of vicarious copyright infringement for all member uploads, since
having control over an infringer's actions is an element in vicarious copyright in-
fringement. Finally, recall that the peer-to-peer networks compete with each other for
"market share." Individual network creators may have decided that instituting any
impediments to downloading would have placed them at a competitive disadvantage
vis-A-vis other networks that had no such impediments. Thus, even though file-sharers
would prefer to upload files to other file-sharers, they might also prefer a system
where they did not have to monitor their own upload/download ratios in order to ac-
quire content.
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1. Files Are Shared in Sufficient Quantities
The file-swapping networks do not require those users who wish
to download files to make their own files available for others to
download. There are few reliable statistics on the extent of file-
sharing on Napster and Gnutella. The only comprehensive study,
by Etyan Adar and Bernardo Huberman, looked at the prevalence
of file-sharing on the Gnutella network during a single twenty-
four-hour period in August of 2000.69 According to that study,
approximately sixty-six percent of those users who were logged in
to the network shared no files, and seventy-three percent of users
shared ten files or fewer." The authors also concluded that band-
width (the speed of an uploader's Internet connection) did not af-
fect file-sharing significantly.71
In describing the implications of their data, Adar and Huberman
predict that if no more than one-third of all file-swappers contin-
ued to make their files available for others to download, the
Gnutella network could be destroyed through what they call the
" Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, 5 First Monday
(Oct. 2000), at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue5_lO/adar/index.html (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association).70 Id.
"' Id. But see Posting of Chakotay, Distributed File Sharing System Problematics, to
kuro5hin.org, at http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2000/10/23/3027/2141 (Oct. 23, 2000)
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (providing anecdotal evidence
that free-riding on Napster is largely a function of users' connection speeds). If no one
chose to download songs from those with slower-speed connections, then there would
be nothing surprising about the lack of differential in sharing rates. The architecture
of the networks indicates, however, that dial-up uploaders do not get a free pass. The
recent versions of peer-to-peer software permit users to "swarm download," that is,
download different identical files from several machines simultaneously to speed up
the transfer time. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. The peer-to-peer appli-
cations thus encourage users to download portions of the same file from several other
users at one time, meaning that a single download will burden both the slower and
faster machines serving a particular file. As a result of this innovation, those with
slower Internet connections now serve more uploads than they used to when users
were only able to download a file from one machine at a time. Moreover, my own ex-
perience with searching for relatively obscure sound recordings reveals that a server
with a modem connection is often the only source for a particular file on the Gnutella
network. This trend is particularly pronounced for music by non-Western artists. In
such instances, where a modem user is the only provider of particular content, she can
expect that downloads will absorb significant quantities of her bandwidth. See infra
text accompanying note 155.
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"tragedy of the digital commons. 7 2 In the authors' words: "If dis-
tributed systems such as Gnutella rely on voluntary cooperation,
rampant free-riding may eventually render them useless, as few in-
dividuals will contribute anything that is new and high quality.
Thus, the current debate over copyright might become a non-issue
when compared to the possible collapse of such systems."73 Adar
and Huberman thus predict the potential downfall of file-sharing
on Gnutella. As users become decreasingly willing to upload files
to others, less content is available on the network, and download-
ers find that there is increased competition to obtain the content
that is available; after all, uploaders can establish viable peer-to-
peer connections with only so many downloaders at a time.
Adar and Huberman's pessimistic characterization of file-
sharing on the Gnutella network mostly misses the mark. While
they observe that only one-third of Gnutella users make content
available for downloading and predict the collapse of the system as
a result, they fail to recognize that this third collectively makes
more than enough content available for the network to function ef-
fectively." In the words of Clay Shirky, "as long as even a small
portion of the users [file-share] ... the system will grow, bringing in
more users, who bring in more songs."75 Moreover, rather than fo-
cusing on why two-thirds of all users download from the Gnutella
network but do not upload to the network, a more pertinent in-
quiry might ask why one-third of all Gnutella users upload despite
the practical absence of any incentive to do so. A more accurate
picture of the file-swapping networks emphasizes that the glass is
not two-thirds empty, but rather one-third full.76
Gnutella's vulnerability stems not from the absence of sharing,
but from the relatively small number of users who create the new
72 Adar & Huberman, supra note 69.
73 Id.
" The 33,335 hosts sampled by the Adar and Huberman study were sharing some
3,100,464 files. Id.
" Shirky, supra note 7, at 33.
76The appropriate analogy for file-sharing may be to a professional baseball player
whose batting average is .333, which is considered to be very high, even though it
means that he gets a hit in far less than half of his at bats. In some other instances,
thirty-three percent noncooperation would prove entirely unviable in maintaining a
system. For example, if even one-third of all beach-goers littered indiscriminately, the
beach would quickly become spoiled and lose much of its appeal. Cristina Bicchieri,
Norms of Cooperation, 100 Ethics 838, 845 (1990).
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content." In order for a file to appear on the network, someone
must go through the trouble of converting media to digital format.
In the case of MP3 files "ripped" from existing CDs, this conver-
sion is easily accomplished with widely available software. In the
case of recently released motion pictures, it requires some level of
industriousness. In any event, once this relatively small group of
users releases popular new content on the network, it can count on
the one-third of users who file-share to spread the new file.
While Adar and Huberman's data is interesting and useful, the
lack of follow-up work and peer review has been frustrating, par-
ticularly given the idiosyncratic nature of the early Gnutella appli-
cations."M Free-riding appears to have been more prevalent on early
Gnutella than on other file-swapping networks. The default user
settings on Napster, as well as on hybrid programs and more recent
Gnutella applications, were such that after a user downloaded a
file, his copy of that file would be available for other users to
download from him.79 In other words, the user's download direc-
tory would, by default, be treated as a "shared" directory from
which other users on the network could download. Similarly, Nap-
ster and Morpheus each contained a default setting whereby up-
loading was enabled whenever the computer on which it was in-
stalled was activated." A user with Napster installed, therefore,
could be uploading copyrighted material obliviously while she was
writing a term paper using Microsoft Word. As a result of these de-
" See Healey, supra note 50, at C5.
78See http://www.limewire.com/index.jsp/netjimprovements (last visited Feb. 11,
2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (noting that the defaults of
the Gnutella prototype, version 0.56, did not cause downloaded files to be shared);
Posting of Finney.org, Incentives for Sharing in P2P Networks, to geocrawler.com, at
http://www.geocrawler.con/archives/3/5025/2001/6/50/5957312 (June 13, 2001) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (arguing that free-loading is less common
where a file-swapping network's default configuration is to allow sharing of all
downloaded files, and that many Gnutella applications that were popular at the time
of the Adar and Huberman study did not permit users to share files); see also Janelle
Brown, The Gnutella Paradox, Salon.com, at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/
2000/09/29/gnutella-paradox/print.html (Sept. 29, 2000) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association) (noting that in the year 2000 Gnutella developers were consider-
ing adjusting the default settings to increase sharing).See Kelly Truelove & Andrew Chasin, Morpheus Out of the Underworld,
OpenP2P.com, at http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2001/07/02/morpheus.html (July 2,
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
11 Id.
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fault settings, the onus was on the free-riding user to opt-out of the
file-sharing system. Opting out usually required a user to select the
application's "options" button, and then check an easily visible box
containing text stating that the user was disabling sharing with
other users. The cost of locating and checking this box, though
minimal, prompted lazy, unsophisticated, or ambivalent network
users to make their files available for others to download." As a re-
sult, some users abided by the default choice regardless of whether
that choice was prosharing or antisharing. 2 Early Gnutella applica-
tions, by contrast, sometimes required users to opt-in to file-
sharing.83 Thus, it is important to note that Adar and Huberman
were studying a very early version of the Gnutella network, one
that was used by a relatively small population of users, and one in
which cooperation was relatively difficult.
In November of 2001, I conducted a follow-up study of the Ka-
zaa/MusicCity network, which was more popular, had many more
users, and was easier to study than Gnutella. Data from that study
revealed that sixty-eight percent of music file-swappers shared at
least one file, and fifty-three percent shared more than ten files.'
81See Philippe Golle et al., Incentives for Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks 7
(2001), at http://crypto.stanford.edu/-pgolle/papers/peer.pdf (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
82 For discussions of the power of defaults generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Switching
the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106 (2002) (arguing that people conform with
default choices in a variety of employment-related contexts); Richard H. Thaler, Psy-
chology and Savings Policies, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 186, 191 (1994) (noting that inertia,
loss aversion, and transaction costs cause employees to accept the default options
connected to their employers' 401(k) plans). From a rational choice perspective, us-
ers' widespread failure to opt out of sharing is puzzling, given the often high cost of
sharing.
8' See supra note 78.
The sample size for my study consisted of 208 unique users who downloaded MP3
files from my hard drive during several sessions in November, 2001. For the purposes
of my study, I compiled a shared directory containing a broadly representative sample
of music files-some new, some old, some desirable, some evidently not so desirable.
For each download I recorded the downloader's user name, the file being
downloaded, the number of files being shared in the user's directory, whether the user
was sharing files that were identified as pornography or child pornography, and
whether the file downloaded appeared in the downloader's own shared directory at
the conclusion of the file transfer. There are several potential sources of bias resulting
from my methodology. First, the sample missed those users who are pure passive up-
loaders-those who constantly upload but rarely download content from others. This
group is evidently small but not nonexistent. Cf. infra note 101 (noting that some
Gnutella users had been logged on for days at a time). At the same time, it is worth
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The median downloader was sharing eighteen songs, the equivalent
of less than two typical music CDs. Just twenty percent of all users
shared more than 100 files each. Yet, according to a survey con-
ducted by Edison Media Research, forty-three percent of file-
swappers admitted downloading 100 or more files.85 Evidently, a
majority of file-swappers with large collections were choosing to
share only portions of those collections. Cooperation, albeit small-
scale cooperation, therefore was the norm on Kazaa/MusicCity. At
least part of this increased sharing, relative to Gnutella, surely
stemmed from the defaults built into these systems. That said,
much of the sharing appears to have been motivated by other fac-
tors because a majority of sharers evidently shared content in a
manner inconsistent with the defaults built into the MusicCity and
Kazaa applications.' Users of Kazaa/MusicCity, like early users of
Gnutella, therefore made conscious decisions about whether to
noting that this group will only be somewhat underrepresented in my sample because
even passive uploaders need to acquire content in order to share content, and
downloading MP3 content from others will usually be less cumbersome than creating
it anew. Second, the sample missed those who are interested in obtaining non-music
content, such as DVD movies and pornographic images. Because of legal, logistical,
and moral constraints, I did not include those files in my sample directory. Third, to
the extent that my music sample was unrepresentative of the music content sought on
the network, there may be a further source of bias. All three sources introduce the
potential for minor sample bias into the study.
85Edison Media Research, The National Record Buyers Study II (2002), at
http://www.edisonresearch.com/R&RRecordBuyersII.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2003)
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Edison's data is based on a sur-
vey conducted in May of 2002, approximately six months after I collected my data.
See also Bill Husted, And the Beat Goes On: Music Downloads Are Going Strong
Despite Napster's Setback, Atlanta J.-Const., Jan. 20, 2002, at 1 (providing anecdotal
evidence suggesting that some users have enormous music collections-numbering in
the "thousands, if not tens of thousands, of songs").
Thirty-two percent of users elected not to share any files, contrary to MusicCity's
defaults. Twenty-two percent of sharers opted not to pass along files they had just
downloaded, behaving in a manner that is both inconsistent with the software defaults
and technically difficult. Finally, it appears, based on the Edison Media Research sur-
vey quoted in the text above, that at least one-half of the remaining sharers elected to
share only a portion of their MP3 collections, which is also inconsistent with the soft-
ware's defaults. In other words, although forty-three percent of file-swappers re-
ported downloading 100 files or more, only twenty percent of the downloaders in my
sample shared 100 files or more. (It is evidently common for users to move files from
their shared directories to non-shared directories from time to time, which allows in-
creased sharing as the size of their shared directories grows with subsequent
downloads. It would have been much simpler for users to opt not to share any files,
yet relatively few chose that option.) See Edison Media Research, supra note 85.
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contribute content to anonymous others, and about the extent of
those contributions. 7 In short, millions of users of Napster,
Gnutella, Kazaa/MusicCity, and other file-swapping networks
made files available for download by total strangers, notwithstand-
ing the users' lack of an obvious incentive for doing so.
0 One study concludes that many Kazaa users do not realize they are sharing files
with other users. See Nathaniel S. Good & Aaron Krekelberg, Usability and Privacy:
A Study of Kazaa P2P File-Sharing 8, at http://hpl.hp.com/shl/papers/kazaa/
KazaaUsability.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association). The methodology of this study, however, is seriously flawed. During a
twelve-hour period, the researchers conducted 443 searches of the Kazaa network
looking for users who were sharing a Microsoft email file entitled "lnbox.dbx." In
these twelve hours, their searches turned up 156 such users. Id. at 2. On the basis of
this data, the authors conclude that "a large number of users are currently sharing
personal and private files without their knowledge." Id. at 1. However, 156 is not a
large number when compared with the millions of Kazaa users who are not sharing
their inbox files. For example, on January 12, 2003, there were 3,896,624 users logged
in to the Kazaa network at 7:30 p.m. Central Standard Time. My search at 7:30 dupli-
cating Good and Krekelberg's methodology revealed only two users, An-
gel0005@kazaa and Sparky8403@kazaa, who were sharing what appears to have
been their inbox files. Placed in context, the finding that during the course of twelve
hours 156 users were therefore unknowingly sharing their personal email hardly sug-
gests that ignorance about what content is being shared is widespread.
The second part of Good and Krekelberg's study is even less convincing. The au-
thors configured twelve computers to run Kazaa and share all of the files on their
hard drives. Good and Krekelberg then invited twelve subjects to use these computers
and asked them to determine whether they thought they were sharing their files with
network users. Id. at 7. Two subjects correctly noted that all files were being shared,
and eight subjects noted that some content was probably being shared, but did not
realize that all their files were being shared. Id. at 8. The remaining two subjects in-
correctly believed that no files were being shared. Id. On the basis of that data, Good
and Krekelberg concluded that "the majority of the users in our study were unable to
tell what files they were sharing, and sometimes incorrectly assumed they were not
sharing any files when in fact they were sharing all files on their hard drive." Id. at 1.
Good and Krekelberg fail to notice an obvious explanation for their users' poor
recognition. While the experimenters enabled sharing in the Kazaa software, they also
prevented any other members of the networks from actually downloading files from
their computers. An easy and intuitive way to determine whether a Kazaa-enabled
computer is set to share files with other members of the network is to look at the "up-
loads" window in Kazaa and wait for another user to begin downloading content. The
uploads screen, as the authors recognize, appears adjacent to the downloads window
in Kazaa. Id. at 6. It is only natural that after seeing no one download any of their files
during an entire Kazaa session, many users would conclude that file-sharing was dis-
abled. Had the firewall not been in place, and had third parties actually been able to
download files from the subjects' computers, the subjects easily would have seen that
sharing was enabled. In light of the way that Good and Krekelberg skewed the test, it
is remarkable that five-sixths of their subjects actually stated that they believed shar-
ing was enabled. In a real-world scenario, the sharing of content on Kazaa is blatant.
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2. Files Are Usually Accurately Labeled and of High Quality
It is exceptionally rare for files to be misidentified on Gnutella
and the other file-swapping networks (the same was true for Nap-
ster as well). A user who downloads a file entitled "Thelonius
Monk-Straight, No Chaser," will almost certainly obtain that tune
performed by that artist. In a few instances, musical compositions
are misidentified, but without any apparent malicious motive. For
example, there was widespread confusion among users of the file-
swapping networks as to who composed "The Flight of the Bumble
Bee."88 Otherwise, the overwhelming majority of music files avail-
able on Gnutella and the hybrid systems are accurately identified
in terms of content.88
Given the amount of mischief that generally pervades the Inter-
net," it is surprising that extensive downloading revealed little evi-
dence of song misidentification on the file-swapping networks. Re-
call that a small percentage of the user population is responsible
for creating the files that hundreds of other users exchange on the
Internet. Furthermore, because of the technological defaults built
into the software, many users of the hybrids automatically make
available for downloading any file they have downloaded. My Ka-
m A Gnutella search reveals that approximately an equal number of "Flight of the
Bumble Bee" files identify its composer as Beethoven and Rimsky Korsakov. Rach-
maninoff is the next most popular answer, followed by Tchaikovsky, and even Mo-
zart.
"From March to August 2001, I downloaded a large sample size of MP3 files from
Napster, Gnutella (using BearShare), and MusicCity's Morpheus. As best I can de-
termine, less than one-half of one percent of these files were substantially mislabeled
as to artist or title. One mild form of misidentification is common: Pornographic files
are often labeled using obvious pornographic terms in addition to the name of a
popular artist. For example, a search for "Christina Aguilera" on Gnutella will turn
up hundreds of MP3 files by that artist and a few hardcore pornographic files in which
the word Aguilera is surrounded by sexually explicit words. This method is apparently
used by pornography lovers as a way of exposing their pornographic content to a
large group of potential downloaders. Of course, no one who downloads such a file
would entertain the notion that the file has even the most remote connection to Chris-
tina Aguilera. This mislabeling therefore has little effect on trust among members.
9 See, e.g., David Anderson, SETI@home, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the Benefits
of a Disruptive Technology, supra note 7, at 67, 73 (discussing the SETI@home appli-
cation, which allows computer users to donate their excess processing capacity to the
analysis of radio waves pursuant to the search for extraterrestrial life, and noting that
a number of participants "doctored their result files, making it appear that their com-
puters had found a strong signal").
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zaa/MusicCity sample revealed that seventy-eight percent of shar-
ers automatically shared a file they had just downloaded. It follows
from these premises that a small but energetic band of uploaders
could rapidly spread large numbers of intentionally misidentified
files through the Internet."
The best-publicized effort to misidentify files available on file-
swapping networks has involved child pornography. The trading of
child pornography on the Internet, and especially on Gnutella, is
rampant.92 One organization that was concerned about Gnutella's
use by child pornographers adopted the file misidentification strat-
egy, albeit with a shame sanctions twist.93 The proprietors of the
website Zeropaid.com posted a number of phony child pornogra-
phy files on Gnutella, then recorded the IP addresses of those who
downloaded them.94 They then posted those addresses on their
website's "Wall of Shame.'" 5 While Zeropaid did not take the next
step of tracing those IP addresses to particular individuals, com-
puter users with moderate sophistication could have done so in
many cases. According to the Zeropaid website, the Wall of
Shame's creators hoped to frighten and shame those who traffic in
child pornography into leaving the Gnutella network. To that end,
Zeropaid's creators also distributed a program called "Fakeroo"
that permitted individual Internet users to create their own walls of
91 One effort to mislabel files is described at Cuckoo Egg FAQ, at
http://www.hand-2-mouth.com/cuckooegg/eggfaq.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2003) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
92 See John Schwartz, File Swapping Is New Route for Internet Pornography, N.Y.
Times, July 28, 2001, at Cl; MSNBC, Gnutella Ignites Porn, Pirate Worries, ZDNet,
at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-519877.html (Apr. 12, 2000) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
9 For illuminating discussions of shame sanctions, see Eric A. Posner, Law and So-
cial Norms 88-11.1 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63
U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 Yale L.J. 1056 (1998).
' An IP address is an Internet Protocol address. Each computer connected to the
Internet is assigned a unique IP address. Some Internet Service Providers use dy-
namic IP addresses, meaning that someone logging in to the Internet on multiple oc-
casions would be assigned a different IP address each time.
"' Kan, supra note 39, at 118-19; MSNBC, Gnutella Porn Surfers Exposed, ZDNet,
at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-11-520437.html?legacy=zdnn (May 3, 2000) (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
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shame.96 Following Zeropaid's lead, several other Gnutella users
have discussed intentionally mislabeling content so as to confuse
and harass those using the network to traffic in child pornogra-
phy.97 Opponents of the Wall of Shame successfully ended Ze-
ropaid's experiment in rather short order. As the late Gene Kan
noted:
The Wall of Shame met a rapid demise in a rather curious and
very Internet way. Once news of its existence circulated on IRC
[an Internet chatting network], Gnutella users with disruptive
senses of humor flooded the network with suggestive searches in
their attempts to get their IP addresses on the Wall of Shame.9
Zeropaid therefore elected to "tear down that wall" after a brief
run, although it did leave archived versions of the Wall on its page
for more than a year.
While not as rare as song misidentifications, faulty recordings
also have been an infrequent nuisance on the file-swapping net-
works. Some MP3 files contain incomplete versions of songs, some
are low-quality recordings, and some contain mysterious screeches
and pops that sound quite unpleasant when reproduced by com-
puter speakers.99 Because these flaws in MP3 files are more difficult
to detect than mislabeling,"° the existence of large numbers of
flawed copies would quickly erode the trust that has developed on
the file-swapping networks.
96 See Zeropaid Clan, Fakeroo, at http://www.zeropaid.com/busted/fake.php (last
visited Nov. 24, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
"For an extended discussion, see Music City: We Can't Stop Child Porn, at
http://www.zeropaid.com/news/articles/auto/09192001a (last visited Dec. 1, 2002) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
18 Kan, supra note 39, at 119.
"9Approximately one and one-half percent of the MP3 files in the sample I
downloaded were significantly flawed. Most of these songs were incomplete, and a
few songs contained harsh and mysterious noises.
"" Mislabeling ordinarily can be detected within a note or two, and a user who plays
a song on his computer before burning it onto his CD would likely delete the misla-
beled version and try to find a properly labeled version. By contrast, a degraded ver-
sion of a song that skips or cuts off early might not be detected by a user until it is
burned onto a CD and listened to in its entirety. At that point, the user generally will
not be able to erase the flawed file, and will need to endure the imperfect version or
burn a new CD.
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3. A Failure of Cooperation: Transmission Disruptions Are Frequent
Obtaining files via a file-swapping network is necessarily a two-
way street. Thus, every file I download is being supplied by another
user somewhere. The nature of the transaction is such that it can be
terminated by either user. It appears that a few file-swappers leave
their computers running file-swapping software indefinitely, either
by default or intentionally, and allow others to download their files
twenty-four-hours a day. ' Most users, however, make their files
available for downloading only while they themselves are searching
for new files. If these users behave self-interestedly, one would ex-
pect that they would regularly log off their networks regardless of
whether anyone is in the midst of a lengthy download. As it turned
out, download cutoffs were one of the more vexing problems on
the Napster and Gnutella networks."2 My own efforts to download
large files-such as DVD movies or complete albums-failed more
often than not. Some portion of these interruptions are attributable
to network errors or failures, but a significant number can be at-
tributed to users shutting down their computers while an upload is
in progress.
10 3
There was an aspirational norm'" on the Napster and Gnutella
networks holding that it was improper to log off the system while
someone else was downloading a file from you. This rule was an-
nounced both through the software itself, which discouraged such
behavior with various warnings and beeps, and through general
101 At the time I was conducting my research in late 2001, BearShare, a Gnutella
program, permitted users to examine how long users who had made files available
had been logged in to the system. (Note, however, that this data was provided only
with respect to about half of all users.) The data generally showed that the majority of
users logged on to the network for less than a few hours, but that a (not insignificant)
minority of users logged on for days at a time.
" See High-Speed Hookup Could Let You Download Napster Better, Houston Chron.,
May 12, 2000, at 4; Kelly Truelove, Gnutella: Alive, Well, and Changing Fast, The
O'Reilly Network, at http://www.openp2p.com/lpt/a//p2p/2001/01/25/trueloveOlOl.html
(Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
103 See Truelove, supra note 102 ("[H]osts may go offline or change their content be-
tween the point of advertising a file and the point of receiving a download request.").
104 For a discussion of aspirational norms that are not strongly adhered to, see Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 Ind. L.J. 1231, 1240-41 (2000).
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discussions of Napster and Gnutella "netiquette."'' 5 Some users
apparently felt pangs of guilt when they logged off the network
while a download was in progress."
Efforts to secure widespread compliance with the aspirational
antitermination norm on Gnutella face a particular disadvantage:
the low likelihood of repeat player situations. Gnutella's public
network consists of a series of networks. Each time a user accesses
Gnutella, she likely connects toa- different segment of the network
and is linked with completely different users. In a close-knit group
it would be relatively easy for a user to retaliate against one who
had terminated in the midst of a transmission by doing the same to
her-the venerable tit-for-tat strategy.' 7 In an environment charac-
terized by anonymity and a lack of opportunities for repeat play-
ing, chances for payback against a user who has just logged off will
be rare.' °8
The prevalence of transmission terminations suggests that the
Napster and Gnutella networks' ability to foster trust and benevo-
lence among users ran up against certain limits. Although a user
may have believed it was "wrong" to shut down his computer while
someone else was downloading a large file, he did so anyway if the
alternative was to keep his computer running unnecessarily over-
night. Download terminations were particularly irritating to three
groups: (1) those who had slow Internet connections; (2) those who
downloaded large files; and (3) those who were in the process of
downloading difficult-to-find files that could not be downloaded
readily from other users. In short, the aspirational anti-termination
norm turned out to be largely ignored in practice.
As a result of the inability of informal norms to solve the termi-
nation problem, computer programmers turned to a technological
,0'See generally Gnutella Forums: Gnutella Network Discussion: being nice (eti-
quette), at http://www.gnutellaforums.com/showthread.php?s=18602f5a72f0507e902dc
801c84ba751&threadid=1988 (last visited Nov. 24, 2002) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association) (displaying postings of various users that discuss the "neti-
quette" of signing off the Gnutella network while another's download is in progress).
'0' See id.
107 See Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 306, 308-16 (1981).
"For discussions of anonymity on the Internet and its influence on social norms,
see Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 30-34 (1999); April Mara
Major, Norm Origin and Development in Cyberspace: Models of Cybernorm Evolu-
tion, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 59, 95-102 (2000).
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fix. The new Gnutella and hybrid file-swapping programs contain
features designed to minimize the termination problem by permit-
ting simultaneous downloads of the same file from different us-
ers."'9 Assuming that all users remain connected throughout the
download, the software will download a portion of the file from
each. If one user disconnects during the download, the other up-
loaders will automatically pick up the slack. Moreover, the new
applications generally permit users to continue aborted downloads
in progress."' Thus, technology created a safety net when uncoop-
erative behavior was too prevalent on the networks.
II. FILE-SWAPPING NORMS
Widespread copyright infringement is nothing new. For years,
users of copyrighted software have exchanged unlicensed copies
with family members and colleagues. Audio cassettes have long
been used to make copies of entire music CDs, which have been
distributed among friends. Choirs copy sheet music and perform
songs without ever thinking about obtaining public performance
rights through legitimate channels. As these behaviors suggest,
copyright laws were frequently ignored among members of close-
knit groups. While making a copy of an album or reading available
to a friend may have been unlawful, there was no social norm con-
straining such de minimis infringement behavior."1 ' As a result, the
copyright laws were largely irrelevant, at least among certain close-
knit groups of individual actors.
Napster and its successors advanced a new norm. Napster em-
powered individual computer users to obtain sound recordings not
only from friends, family members, and co-workers, but from
anonymous individuals they had never met and never would meet.
It facilitated peer-to-peer file transfers among computer users on
different continents. The relevant universe of potential transaction
partners for copyright infringers was expanded to unprecedented
"" See, e.g., Why LimeWire?, at http://www.limewire.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2003)
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (noting that LimeWire's "'swarm'
downloads from multiple hosts help[] get files faster").
:: See id. (describing the availability of "resume downloads").
'See Wu, supra note 47 (manuscript at 25) (noting "widespread anecdotal evi-
dence to suggest a normative difference between commercial and non-commercial
copying") (citation omitted).
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levels. 2 An individual, aided by this technology, could easily en-
gage in de maximus copyright infringement without ever leaving
his home.
Whereas popular norms during the 1980s likely would have tol-
erated an individual's making a copy of the Pacman game for a
trusted acquaintance, they would not have tolerated that same in-
dividual's making hundreds of unauthorized copies of Pacman and
distributing them to strangers across the globe.' 3 Yet that is pre-
cisely what a Gnutella user does by making such files available for
others to download. The transition from de minimis to de maximus
file-sharing has significantly weakened reverence for intellectual
property rights, even relative to where it stood a decade or two
ago.'14 The file-swapping networks therefore represent a particu-
larly brazen and successful attack on intellectual property rights.
' Before Internet access became widespread, computer Bulletin Board Services
("BBS"'s) made hacked copies of computer games and other software available to
their members, often for free. That said, the universe of members was ordinarily con-
strained geographically to those for whom dialing into the BBS would be a local call.
(Given the slowness of downloads on the modems of the day, very few individuals
would find it worth their while to pay long distance telephone rates in order to access
a remote BBS.) Moreover, BBS system operators ("sysops") who made copyrighted
content available numbered only in the thousands domestically. Sysops were an odd
bunch-I know, as I used to be one during my teenaged years-and very dissimilar
from society as a whole. For more on sysop culture, see Jonathan Marshall, Boom in
Computer Bulletin Boards: Off-Roading Beyond the Internet, S.F. Chron., Dec. 5,
1994, at Al. Once Napster brought in tens of millions of domestic file-swappers, it be-
gan dealing with a user population that was much more reflective of society as a
whole and mainstream values.
"' See Comments of Peter K. Schalestock, Panel One: The Road to Napster: Inter-
net Technology & Digital Content, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 363, 381 (2000).
114 One needs to be cautious in suggesting that popular attitudes have shifted in re-
sponse to technological change. Not surprisingly, Gallup never thought to ask the
people it polled in the early 1980s whether it would be morally wrong to obtain free
sound recordings from strangers over computer networks; existing technologies sim-
ply did not make such behavior feasible, and so it never occurred to anyone to ask
about it. What one can do is compare the survey responses of Americans socialized
during the pre-Internet era to those of Americans who grew up in the last decade to
see whether they view file-swapping differently. If we detect a difference in the two
groups' responses, then we may be in the midst of a shift in norms, with older Ameri-
cans adhering to the norms they acquired during their formative years and younger
Americans embracing a new norm. It turns out that different age groups view the mo-
rality of file-swapping quite differently.
According to a Pew poll taken shortly before the Napster decision, sixty-four per-
cent of those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine believe that there is noth-
ing wrong with downloading music for free off the Internet. Lenhart & Fox, supra
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The simple account of how the types of transactions that Napster
facilitated became socially acceptable is based entirely on the
emergence of the new technology. On this account, the absence of
an anti-de minimis infringement norm was a function of transaction
costs. Small-scale infringement was relatively inexpensive for the
individual infringer and evidently did little to harm copyright hold-
ers' bottom lines. Indeed, under certain conditions, sharing among
members of a close-knit group may have increased copyright hold-
ers' profits. 1 5 Historically, large-scale infringement was different in
two ways. First, it required significant investments in technology
for duplicating digital media. Second, and relatedly, it had the ob-
vious potential to adversely affect copyright holders' profits. Thus,
a large-scale infringer was someone who had invested a not-
insignificant amount of resources in expanding his capacity to in-
fringe, presumably in order to recover a not-insignificant amount
of revenue at the copyright holders' expense. Napster dramatically
lowered the transaction costs of becoming a large-scale infringer
and removed the necessary implication that a large-scale infringer
was trying to profit personally from her activities."6 In short, large-
scale Napster sharers looked more like altruists than thieves and
note 15, at 6. By contrast, forty-three percent of those aged thirty to forty-nine and
twenty-eight percent of those aged fifty to sixty-four believe that there is nothing
wrong with such downloading. Id. Fifty-one percent of Internet users aged eighteen to
twenty-nine had downloaded music by February 2001, compared to only twenty-three
percent of those aged thirty to forty-nine, and fifteen percent of those Internet users
aged fifty or older. Graziano & Rainie, supra note 19, at 4. Edison Media Research
asked respondents whether they agreed with the following statement: "There is noth-
ing morally wrong about downloading music for free from the Internet." Edison Me-
dia Research, supra note 85. Seventy-four percent of those aged twelve to seventeen
agreed with the statement, as did fifty-nine percent of those aged eighteen to twenty-
four. Yet only forty-five percent of those aged twenty-five to thirty-four and thirty-
nine percent of those aged thirty-five to forty-four agreed with the statement. Id.
While a change in norms is the most plausible account for these differential polling
results, it is also conceivable that older respondents are naturally more skeptical of
technologies that challenge existing property regimes or that older respondents have a
more informed understanding of the justification for providing record labels with a
revenue stream through album sales. The passage of time will resolve this question, as
pollsters will have an opportunity to examine whether today's youthful cohorts carry
their pro-file-swapping views with them into middle age.
"' Yannis Bakos et al., Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & Econ. 117, 123 (1999).
"
6Napster also flourished at a time when CD burning technology was becoming
inexpensive. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263,273-74 (2002).
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no longer deserved the scorn that had previously been reserved for
those who sold knock-off CDs on street corners. In my view,
though, this technological shift was a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for the norm shift that followed. A complete explanation
requires at least some examination of the role played by the media
and other opinion leaders in promoting Napster.
A. The Social Norms Framework: The Emergence of Norms
Social norms are patterns of behavior that are widely adhered to
by some group of individuals, at least in part because of social pres-
sures to conform to that norm."7 In close-knit settings, this social
pressure may take the form of ostracism or the loss of esteem for
those who violate existing social norms, and increased esteem for
those who enforce or abide by these norms (the "Richard
McAdams theory"), or a desire to obtain the economic rewards
that are conferred upon those who signal their suitability for coop-
erative exchanges by enforcing or abiding by existing norms (the
"Eric Posner theory")."8 Alternatively, as I will argue in Section
III.D.1, the social pressure engendering norm enforcement can be
self-imposed: an individual may conform to a norm because her
self esteem depends on her compliance with it. Regardless of how
they arise, social norms often will have two components: normative
(how people ought to behave) and descriptive (how people do be-
have)." 9
Three related insights are foundational in the social norms litera-
ture. First, people's behavior often conforms more closely with so-
cial norms regarding how people should behave than with laws that
..7 See Strahilevitz, supra note 104, at 1234 n.11.
"' McAdams posits that norms are enforced and effective because individuals value
esteem among their peers, and compliance with and enforcement of existing norms
are ways of obtaining esteem from peers. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, De-
velopment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 355-72 (1997); see also
Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1989, at 85, 95-97 (articu-
lating a similar theory). By contrast, Posner argues that norms are enforced and ad-
hered to because compliance with norms is a means by which a member of society
signals to his peers that he is an individual with a low discount rate, and hence some-
one who would be a good partner for future cooperative relationships and transac-
tions. Posner, supra note 93, at 18-27.
"' Strahilevitz, supra note 104, at 1234 n.il.
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instruct people how to behave.'20 Second, because of the power of
social norms, those laws that parallel social norms will be adhered
to most widely and enforced most easily.'2 Third, under certain
conditions, government laws and policies can alter social norms.22
B. How the Pro-File-Swapping Norms Emerged
1. Norm Entrepreneurs
In the case of Napster and Gnutella, norm entrepreneurs played
an important role in fostering the emerging pro-file-swapping
norms. Napster's norm entrepreneurs were the handful of pro-
grammers who created the new network and the people who up-
loaded the initial copyrighted content, many of whom were friends
or acquaintances of Napster's primary programmer."' This group
0 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003,
1009 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 361, 398-99 (2001).
12 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Struc-
tural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643,
1694 (1996); Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky
Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607, 607-09 (2000); Saul Levmore, Norms as Sup-
plements, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1989, 1998-99, 2006-08 (2000); Tyler, supra note 120, at 402.
' See Lessig, supra note 108, at 92-93; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 910 (1996).
123 See Spencer E. Ante, Inside Napster, Bus. Wk., Aug. 14, 2000, at 112, 114-15. It is
worth noting that Napster's programmers did not create their new network out of
whole cloth. Rather, the Napster network was made possible by a number of techno-
logical innovations during previous years, including the development of various file
transfer protocols, the spread of high-speed Internet access, and the creation of the
MP3 format for compressing sound recordings. Baker, supra note 8, at 6; Sheldon W.
Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role of Copyright Law, 62 Ohio St.
L.J. 569, 569 (2001). Another factor that helped make Napster possible was the prolif-
eration of the "Netscape business model," whereby software creators obtained ven-
ture capital financing that would allow them to give away their software applications
to end users. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1384-85 (1996) ("One such strategy
has already begun to emerge: giving away information at no charge-what might be
called the 'Netscape strategy'-as a means of building up reputational capital that can
subsequently be converted into income (for example, by means of the sale of ser-
vices).") (citation omitted). The theory behind this business model was that giving
away content would allow applications to gain market share and that this market
share could later be exploited to generate revenue through advertising, sales of up-
grades, and the like. Napster followed the Netscape model.
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consisted of slightly more than thirty people." Yet within a matter
of days, the online word-of-mouth had spread news of the new ap-
plication, and Napster had been downloaded by 3000 to 4000 peo-
ple.
25
Napster's primary creator evidently did not give any thought to
whether his network would be unlawful before he launched it,2 6 yet
he plainly intended to deprive the recording industry of its control
over access to and distribution of sound recordings.' The words
and actions of these norm entrepreneurs were suggesting that it
was acceptable for computer users to exchange copyrighted sound
recordings in the MP3 format over the Internet. One message
communicated by these actions was that copyright laws should
have no application on the Internet. A second message implied
that regardless of what the copyright laws said, technological im-
peratives and consumer demand would trump legal niceties.
2. Opinion Leaders
In Napster's first year of existence, a period in which its user
base expanded from thirty'28 to 25 million, 29 Napster received sur-
prisingly little attention from mainstream media opinion leaders.
Napster's test version was launched on June 1, 1999, and by Octo-
ber of that year, Napster traffic accounted for twenty to thirty per-
cent of the bandwidth usage at major universities.'3 ° Yet during the
remainder of the calendar year, Napster was virtually ignored by
mainstream media. A three sentence blurb in the Newsbytes wire
service appeared on July 23, 1999, touting Napster as a useful new
12 Ante, supra note 123, at 115.
12 5 Id.
26 Comments of Ann Bartow, Panel Three: New Business Models, Regulatory Op-
tions and the Future of Copyright on the Internet, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 425, 442 (2000);
Greenfeld, supra note 7, at 64. Evidently, his uncle, an important business strategist
for the start-up, did give the legality of Napster a great deal of thought, and consulted
with legal counsel rather early on during the company's existence. Ante, supra note
123, at 115.
127 See A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Shirky, supra note 7, at 28.
'28 Ante, supra note 123, at 115.
" Becky Beaupre, Suit Can't Stop Napster from Gaining, Chi. Sun-Times, Aug. 28,
2000, at 26 (suggesting that by July of 2000, Napster had "at least 25 million" users).
'30 Ante, supra note 123, at 115.
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application for obtaining MP3 files.' Radio silence persisted again
until November 2, 1999, when the Israeli newspaper Ha'Aretz fea-
tured a brief description of the Napster service. "2 It was not until
the RIAA sued Napster that the major media outlets began to take
notice of the growing phenomenon. Salon.com appears to have
scooped the news regarding the impending lawsuit on November
17, 1999,' and within a few weeks the Wall Street Journal began to
cover the story. 4 Over the next year, Napster became the subject
of thousands of mainstream news articles.
During these first few months, when Napster went from being a
college student's idea to a copyright-infringement juggernaut, there
was a dearth of commentary from opinion leaders'35 on the phe-
nomenon. It is unclear why Napster received so little coverage dur-
ing its infancy. Major media outlets may have made a conscious
decision not to report on the service so as to avoid encouraging its
use. More likely, however, the major media outlets simply missed
the story.
If the mainstream media abdicated their role as opinion leaders,
who stepped into the opinion vacuum? In this instance, the primary
answer appears to be ordinary Internet users who felt the need to
spread the gospel of Napster. For example, computer programmer
David de Groot claims to have been the original uploader of Nap-
ster to Download.com, which is the Internet's premier source of
downloadable software applications. ' Download.com contains a
system of "user ratings" whereby those who download an applica-
"' Martyn Williams, Internet Update, Newsbytes, July 23, 1999, available at LEXIS,
Wire Service Stories File.
' Zvika Alberger, Cutting the Chords: MP3 Has Replaced Sex as the Biggest Thing
on the Internet, Ha'Aretz (Tel Aviv, Israel), Nov. 2, 1999, available at Westlaw, West-
news, AP Newswires - Plus File.
"'I See Janelle Brown, MP3 Crackdown, Salon.com, at http://www.salon.com/tech/
log/1999/11/17/riaa/index.html (Nov. 17, 1999) (on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association).
"" See Don Clark, Recording Industry Group Sues Napster, Alleging Copyright
Infringement on Net, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1999, at B18.
"' For a discussion of the role that opinion leaders generally play in transforming
norms, see Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
1, 16 (2001).
136 David de Groot, Napster: A History, Epinions.com, at http://epinions.com/cmd-
review-38E8-2919A149-3A426109-prod2?sp=ink (Dec. 21, 2000) (on file with the Vir-
ginia Law Review Association).
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tion rank it according to various criteria, provide a narrative dis-
cussing what they like or do not like about the application, and
provide an overall "thumbs up" or "thumbs down" assessment of
the new product. Napster immediately received enthusiastic re-
sponses from those who had downloaded it, and this positive word
of mouth spurred a cascade of further downloading. In the absence
of commentary from trusted opinion leaders, these untrusted opin-
ion leaders were able to embrace and spread the emerging norm.
Other venues, such as college dormitories137 and Internet chat
rooms, provided alternative channels for enthusiastic Napster users
to spread their message.
That is not to say that mainstream opinion leaders played no
role in the growth of the file-swapping norm. When the major me-
dia outlets finally began reporting on the story, many gave cre-
dence to Napster's argument that the legality of the file-swapping
service was a "gray area" of the law. 38 By repeating the tenuous
proposition that Napster (and by extension its users) was not guilty
of copyright infringement, these opinion leaders emboldened users
who were tempted to use the new application. If the program pro-
vided a user-friendly way to access an enormous library of free
sound recordings, if its legality was unclear, and if copyright hold-
ers were unable to convince the public that downloading copy-
righted content for free was wrong, then why should any computer
user decide not to use the application?
In the months following the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Napster,
opinion leaders showed little sign of changing their tune on file-
... See Reuters, Napster Users Majority on Campus, Wired News, at
http:/www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,36354,00.html (May 15, 2000) (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
"3 Clark, supra note 134, at B18; see also Ante, supra note 123, at 114 ("In an e-mail
obtained by Business Week, John Fanning even suggests that there is only a 10%
chance that Napster could lose a court case."); Greenfeld, supra note 7, at 66 (quoting
the assertion of Napster attorney David Boies that the company had a fifty-fifty
chance of prevailing in the RIAA lawsuit); Eric Boehlert, The Great MP3 Love Fest:
Has the Press Given Napster a Free-ride?, Salon.com, at http://dir.salon.com/business/
feature/2000/08/01/napsterpress/index.html (Aug. 1, 2000) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association) ("From the get-go, disturbing signs suggested the press was
more interested in advancing Napster's story as a David-vs.-Goliath tale than in seri-
ously addressing the intricate issues at hand."). But see Brown, supra note 133,
("While ripping yourself an MP3 copy of a CD you've purchased for personal use is
perfectly legal, it is illegal to share that file with anyone else.").
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swapping. Perhaps the most telling sign of the emerging consensus
appeared in a front-page New York Times article on July 20,
2001."39 The subject matter of the article was rather unremarkable
in that it reported on the phenomenon of users moving from Nap-
ster to Gnutella and the hybrids in the wake of the court-imposed
restrictions on Napster. The surprising aspect of the article was the
rather detailed instructions it contained explaining how to obtain
these file-swapping programs.4' Thus, the most respected newspa-
per in the United States, owned by a corporation whose profits are
largely derived from its copyrighted content, essentially concluded
that the public had a right to know how to obtain unauthorized
copies of copyrighted sound recordings and motion pictures.
Months after the Ninth Circuit's Napster decision, when the legal-
ity of such downloading was no longer subject to serious dispute,
the New York Times implicitly acknowledged that unlawful
downloading would remain alive and well. Within a week, other
major newspapers were following suit, with the Orlando Sentinel
publishing a lengthy review of the various Napster alternatives and
comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each one.4 '
3. Polling Data
The Napster district court concluded that Napster's exploits had
"contributed to a new attitude that digitally-downloaded songs
ought to be free. 1 42 In order to test that conclusion, it is necessary
to look at the polling that has been done with respect to the per-
ceived morality of Napster's services. A number of public opinion
polls have gauged Americans' views toward the unauthorized
downloading of copyrighted sound recordings. The most rigorous
and informative of these polls have been conducted by the Pew
Internet and American Life Project. According to a Pew poll taken
during mid-2000, seventy-eight percent of those Internet users who
had downloaded music from the Internet stated that they did not
139 See Richtel, supra note 1.
'40 See id.
141 See Ron Harris, Testdrive: File Sharing Applications, Orlando Sentinel, July 27,
2001, available at LEXIS, Global News Wire File.
142 A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (em-
phasis added).
542 [Vol. 89:505
2003] Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks
consider themselves to be "stealing" the music.143 Among all
Americans, however, forty percent stated that those who
downloaded music off the Internet for free were doing nothing
wrong, thirty-five percent believed that the practice amounted to
stealing, and twenty-five percent would not address the propriety
of such activities or gave inconsistent answers."'
The Pew Internet Project has not released any follow-up polling
data to test the influence that the Ninth Circuit's Napster decision
has had on public attitudes. However, a public opinion poll con-
ducted in the summer of 2002 (more than one year after the Nap-
ster decision was handed down) revealed an evenly divided popu-
lace, with fifty-two percent of those polled agreeing that "[t]here is
nothing morally wrong about downloading music for free from the
143 Lenhart & Fox, supra note 15, at 5. As with any poll, the way the question is
posed alters the results somewhat. When specifically asked about copyright infringe-
ment, a larger minority of Internet users expressed concerns about the morality of
their activity. Sixty-one percent of downloaders stated that they do not care whether
the music they downloaded is copyrighted, whereas thirty-one percent stated that the
music's copyrighted status was something that concerned them. Id.
'4 Id. at 6. Another poll of home Internet users conducted during the summer of
2000 revealed similar results. Just 23.4% of those polled agreed with the statement
that "[d]ownloading music without paying for it is a form of piracy and should be ille-
gal," whereas 46.3% disagreed. Poll Suggests Home PC Users Favor Napster's Argu-
ments, Tech L.J. (July 27, 2000), at http://www.techlawjoumal.com/intelpro/20000727.asp
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). A mere 15.6% favored shutting
down services such as Napster and Gnutella, whereas 45.1% opposed such a shut-
down. Id. Finally 55.9% of those polled agreed with the statement that
"[d]ownloading music over the Internet is simply a harmless way of allowing free ex-
change of music," whereas 17% disagreed. Id. The wording of the Tech Law Journal
questions was somewhat problematic (for example, everyone ought to agree that
downloading public domain music without paying for it should not be illegal, but the
poll did not distinguish between authorized and unauthorized downloading of free
music). These concerns aside, the results of that poll generally comport with those of
the Pew Center's more reliable poll. A similar poll conducted at approximately the
same time revealed similar results. See Press Release, Majority of Americans Agree
that Downloading Free Music from the Internet Will Increase, Taylor Nelson Sofres
Intersearch, at http://www.intersearch.tnsofres.com/press/releases/violations.htm (Feb. 22,
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (finding that 18% of Inter-
net users said downloading music from the Internet without paying is wrong and that
they would not do it; that 11% of users said it is wrong, but everyone else does it, so




Internet," and forty-eight percent disagreeing with that state-
ment.
41
As these numbers indicate, a significant portion of the
American public believes that users who download copyrighted
content without paying for it are behaving immorally. Yet these in-
dividuals do not perceive themselves as having any personal stake
in enforcing the norm. Those who feel file-swapping is immoral are
unlikely to be exposed to the activities of file-swappers because
much of this activity occurs in the privacy of file-swappers' homes.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that those who believe file-swapping
is immoral feel strongly enough about the issue to impose social
sanctions on file-swappers.
a. Norm Enforcement - Anti-File-Swapping
While almost one-half of the American public believes that
downloading copyrighted sound recordings from Napster,
Gnutella, or the hybrids is morally wrong, there has been virtually
no effort to use that sentiment to enforce laws against unauthor-
ized downloading. Members of the public who believe that unau-
thorized downloading is theft have been unwilling to do anything
to combat the practice. Nor has any social disapproval been di-
rected at the millions of "thieves" who are stealing copyrighted
content. File-swapping may well be like speeding on the freeway-
a widely tolerated, technical violation of a rule that invokes virtu-
ally no moral outrage when done in moderation.'46
Young people frequently lend homemade CDs containing illic-
itly copied MP3 files to friends. Known unauthorized downloaders
are not shunned, blackballed, or otherwise subjected to any kind of
social sanction. While individuals who download child pornogra-
phy off Gnutella have been subjected to minor shame sanctions,"7
no one has ever thought to do the same to the millions of individu-
als who are downloading copyrighted content off the same net-
"i' Edison Media Research, supra note 85. Edison Media also asked those who had
downloaded music off the Internet in the past whether they had reservations about
doing so in the future. Thirty-eight percent said they had no reservations about doing
so, fifty-four percent said they had some reservations about doing so, and five percent
stated that they would not download in the future. Id.
'46 See Strahilevitz, supra note 104, at 1242 n.53.
47 See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
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work. While large-scale file-sharers might be prosecuted, it is
widely believed that the public could not stomach widespread
prosecutions of individual computer users who had illicitly
downloaded copyrighted content.'48 As Robert Litan concludes, "it
is highly doubtful that Americans would tolerate for very long, if at
all, the police raiding homes and arresting teenagers for copying
music or movies."'' 9 Although a large segment of society may be-
lieve that unauthorized downloading of copyrighted content is im-
moral, virtually no one in society believes in these principles
strongly enough to enforce an anti-file-swapping norm. The only
Americans who appear to have particularly strong feelings about
the morality of file-swapping are the file-swappers themselves and
the creators of copyrighted content. Because there are a great
number of the former and very few of the latter, informal enforce-
ment of the private property norm has been almost nonexistent.
b. Norm Enforcement - Pro-File-Swapping
Norm enforcement among the pro-file-swapping portion of soci-
ety is easier to detect. Among those Americans who have never
downloaded music from the Internet, there are virtually no signs of
pro-file-swapping norm enforcement activities. The most signifi-
cant exception is the celebrity status that has been conferred upon
Napster's founder, Shawn Fanning. As one author noted, using
only a bit of hyperbole, "Fanning had been on more magazine cov-
ers than anyone since John F. Kennedy.""1 ' A gushing Time profile
of Fanning summarized his status thusly:
' See Melanie Warner, The New Napsters, Fortune, Aug. 12, 2002, at 115, 116
("The RIAA is considering a far riskier strategy-suing individuals who share large
numbers of files on Kazaa, Grokster, or Morpheus. It's a tactic guaranteed to infuri-
ate and alienate music fans, and it underscores the awful bind record labels are in.").
149Litan, supra note 48, at 1070; see also Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to
Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 Ga. L. Rev. 1129, 1158-59 (2001) (noting
that owners are more likely to target commercial enterprises because of the unpopu-
larity and difficulty of targeting individual users); Aaron M. Bailey, Comment, A Na-
tion of Felons?: Napster, the Net Act, and the Criminal Prosecution of File-Sharing,
50 Am. U. L. Rev. 473, 514 (2000) (discussing the factors that prevent prosecutions of
individual file-swappers).
... Alderman, supra note 29, at 163 (referring to a statement made by Senator Orrin
Hatch).
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As the creator of Napster, Fanning has reached a level of fame
unprecedented for a 19-year-old who is neither a sports hero nor
a pop star. He's been on the cover of Fortune, BusinessWeek,
Forbes, and the Industry Standard and has been profiled just
about everywhere else. His name and his face-those piercing
blue eyes, wide cheeks and stolid expression under the ever pre-
sent University of Michigan baseball cap-have become syn-
onymous with the promise of the Internet to empower computer
users and the possibility that some kiddie-punk programmer will
destroy entire industries. Strangers pick him out at the mall buy-
ing a burrito or watching a San Francisco Giants game or just
driving around in his newly customized Mazda RX-7. He intro-
duced Britney Spears at the MTV Video Music Awards. Nike has
offered him a shoe deal.51
Fanning has garnered enormous social benefits as a result of his
change-agent activities. By valorizing him, the public encouraged
the millions of teenagers who follow in his (Nike-imprinted) foot-
steps and contribute content to his network.
The creators of the Gnutella network have not achieved the
same level of fame as Fanning, but that is not to say that their acts
have gone unrewarded in terms of social benefits. The program-
mers who created successful peer-to-peer networks, or who solved
technical problems that arose on the existing networks, obtained
the significant esteem of their peers. As Stephen McJohn has noted
in the context of open source"' programmers:
Many open source authors are spurred to create code by incen-
tives other than copyright: the love of elegant problem solving
(a.k.a. hacking), status among their peers, the wish to further
computer science and make things better generally, and even
animosity toward commercial software developers .... Looking
only to material considerations, open source developers might
appear to be acting contrary to rational economic incentives, by
giving away software. However, when one considers the return in
... Greenfeld, supra note 7, at 66.52 Most of the Gnutella applications are open source applications, meaning that the
code is made public, so any programmer is licensed to alter and distribute applications
that contain elements of the original open source program, provided she in turn
makes her own applications available to the public.
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terms of increased status among software developing peers (i.e.,
showing off technical prowess, or receiving approval for partici-
pating in the open source movement, or building relationships in
the development process), ample incentives become apparent. 15 3
It is this desire for the support of one's peers that is particularly
important in helping to craft subgroup norms.'
Thus, the widespread popularity of downloading music files be-
comes understandable when one recognizes how Napster's file-
sharing technology lowered the transaction costs of copyright in-
fringement and undermined the anti-infringement norms that had
existed among some members of the public. It is now appropriate
to turn to the much more interesting half of the file-swapping equa-
tion.
III. CHARISMATIC CODE AND COOPERATIVE NORMS IN LOOSE-
KNIT GROUPS
So far, my account of the file-swapping networks has focused
predominantly on the downloading aspect of the file-swapping
transactions. It has explained how downloading files from these
networks became socially acceptable and why a downloader of
unlicensed copies of copyrighted content was likely to encounter
few, if any, social sanctions from those individuals who were ex-
posed to the real-world manifestations of this online behavior.
Although this account talks of norm transformations in society
at large, the social norms theories built upon discussions of how
norms emerge and evolve within close-knit groups are still perti-
nent. Hence potential file-swappers respond to behavioral envi-
ronments in their dormitories, high school cafeterias, workplaces,
and living rooms, and those environments partially reflect the
norms that are conveyed through the mass media. Societal norms
may be the mere aggregation of the norms that emerge from a mul-
titude of overlapping close-knit groups.
... Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25,
42 (2000). For a balanced and insightful account of the open source programmers' in-
centives and motivations, see David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source
Software, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241 (2001). For discussions of social norms among com-
puter hackers, with whom Gnutella creators may also identify, see Lessig, supra note
108, at 194, and Major, supra note 108, at 77-78.
" Major, supra note 108, at 76.
548 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 89:505
Where downloading from networks is easy and provides signifi-
cant benefits at low costs, little need be done to convince people to
use these networks to download content. The fact that file-
swapping change-agents such as Shawn Fanning and Gnutella crea-
tor Justin Frankel are valorized adds fuel to the fire. Downloading
is attractive, acceptable within the relevant peer groups, and cool.
So what if it's illegal? Such thinking has driven one-half of the file-
swapping revolution.
A robust account of these networks also requires one to consider
the puzzling question of why so many of the networks' users
choose to share their content with others despite the absence of
obvious incentives for doing so. After all, if no one-or very few
people-contributed content to the networks, then the networks
would become an unattractive source for copyrighted content and
would lose much of their user base.
A. Charismatic Code Defined
Virtually everyone who participates in one of the file-swapping
networks is breaking the law in the process. Ordinarily, people are
unlikely to trust lawbreakers, especially anonymous lawbreakers.
Yet a remarkable sense of trust permeates these networks. As was
suggested in Part I, it is possible to observe significant levels of co-
operative behavior, very little by way of destructive behavior, and
substantial trust among the anonymous users of these networks.
Furthermore, the networks have survived and thrived largely be-
cause of their users' dogged willingness to engage in unlawful ac-
tivities. As Glynn Lunney notes, "[flor private sharing to occur,
someone must undertake the expense of loading the work on her
computer and then open her computer to others, with consequen-
tial risks to security and her bandwidth usage."'55 While the cost of
sharing is low for those sharing music files via high-speed Internet
connections, the cost is much higher for their modem-using breth-
ren. Yet those with slower connections appear to share content at
"' Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copy-
ing, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 Va. L. Rev. 813, 868 n.186 (2001);
see also Brown, supra note 78 ("'There's very little reward for you sharing your files,
and there's a high cost.., because [due to bandwidth limitations] even if you're on a
DSL connection you can't do other things that you want to do."') (quoting a state-
ment made by Eytan Adar).
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substantially the same (relatively high) rates.56 Moreover, thou-
sands incur a serious risk of severe criminal penalties by uploading
pornography (including child pornography) to strangers. What on
earth causes people to behave in such a manner?
In this Part, I argue that the primary answer to that question is
"charismatic code," a technology that presents each member of a
community with a distorted picture of his fellow community mem-
bers by magnifying cooperative behavior and masking uncoopera-
tive behavior. I then suggest that charismatic code is particularly
potent in this case because it successfully taps into internalized and
nearly universal norms of reciprocity.158 The various applications
are all cleverly designed to encourage cooperation by as many us-
ers as possible. In one sense, the applications harness the actual
members of the community to become actors for norm enforce-
ment purposes by magnifying the actions of those who cooperate
and masking the actions of those who do not. In another sense, the
applications act as a substitute for the community of actors and en-
forcers, inculcating in their users those norms most likely to lead to
the success and expansion of the networks. Finally, the applica-
tions' architecture underscores the reciprocity on which the success
of the file-swapping networks depends.
' 
6 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
"1
7 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000) (criminalizing the uploading of visual depictions
of actual minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct).
"'This discussion is foreshadowed in Lemley, supra note 63, at 1287 ("Code can
also serve to enforce social norms. Rules of behavior can be designed into the archi-
tecture of the Net itself, or written into software that is used in particular cases .... If
the code is written with Net norms in mind, it can reinforce those norms .... "). My
discussion is complementary to the approach expressed in Lessig, supra note 108, at
85-90. Lessig identifies four "regulators" in cyberspace: law, markets, norms, and ar-
chitecture. Id. at 87-88. In Lessig's view, architecture, or code, is a particularly power-
ful regulator of liberty in Cyberspace. Id. at 86. Lessig sees code as rules that are built
into the architecture of the Internet and software applications. See, e.g., Lawrence
Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L.J. 869, 896 (1996)
("These are constraints, just as law and social norms are constraints, but they are not
constraints that one chooses to follow or not. One cannot flout the password require-
ment."). The example of the file-swapping networks demonstrates that code itself can
significantly influence social norms and user behavior.
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B. The Distorted Image
Some file-swappers will share their files with other network
members regardless of whether they believe others are sharing. It
seems that a large number of users, however, will engage in condi-
tional cross-cooperation-sharing their files only if they believe
that a norm of sharing exists. The challenge for creators of peer-to-
peer networks is to convince these many conditional cooperators to
share.
I mentioned earlier that only about one-third of all users of the
Gnutella network apparently made any of their content available
for downloading by others.'59 The creators of the Gnutella network
knew this, and yet they said it was not so. Until recently, one of the
first images a new Gnutella user was likely to encounter upon in-
stalling the software for the first time and learning how it works
was a screen entitled "What Is Gnutella?". That screen falsely told
users: "The other half of Gnutella is giving back. Almost everyone
on GnutellaNet shares their stuff."'" While there is nothing terribly
persuasive about telling a lie per se, the genius of Gnutella is the
way in which it makes that lie look like a reality to its users. As we
shall see, if that lie is persuasive enough, it can develop into a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
Gnutella's creators have attempted to situate its users in an envi-
ronment that makes it appear as if a norm of sharing and coopera-
tion exists on the network. Charismatic code is the primary tool in
that effort. Because of the way the networks are structured, the ac-
tions of those who share content are quite visible,'61 while the ac-
" Supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
'b" What Is Gnutella?, supra note 44.
161 Of course, like many acts on the Internet, file-sharing is quite visible in cyber-
space, but virtually invisible in real space. In real space, file-sharing consists mostly of
an individual using his home computer to run a file-swapping application. Few of the
file-sharer's neighbors are likely to learn of the copyright infringement that is occur-
ring in such close proximity to them. Yet to fellow file-swappers in cyberspace, the
transaction will be quite visible, even if the parties' true identities are not. Cf. Tussey,
supra note 149, at 1160 (noting that downloading copyrighted materials off the Inter-
net, "while accomplished in private surroundings, is essentially a public transaction").
In this sense, file-swapping networks, which broadcast the extent of criminal behavior,
are different from other forms of criminality on the Internet. See generally Katyal,
supra note 120, at 1109 ("[U]nlike crimes in realspace, those in cyberspace are almost
always invisible. There are no bars on the windows to glimpse and no loiterers and
panhandlers to avoid."). The important exception arises in college dormitories, where
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tions of those who do not share content are virtually invisible.'62
Particularly if a user is searching for content by an especially popu-
lar artist, she will have no trouble locating scores of other users
who have made that artist's work available. Users who share no
files, on the other hand, do not appear in response to user searches.
Therefore, other users generally will have a very difficult time per-
ceiving non-sharers' participation in the networks. The architecture
of the networks is such that although many users on the networks
do not share, the networks create an appearance that sharing is the
norm. This dynamic-the magnified visibility of sharers and the in-
visibility of non-sharers-exists on every successful file-swapping
application I have seen.
Some of the networks are careful to present data that reinforces
this image of widespread file-sharing. For example, the MusicCity
Morpheus application prominently displayed the total number of
users logged in to the network at a given time, as well as the aggre-
gate number of files being shared.'63 These statistics not only punc-
tuate the ubiquity of usership, they also imply the widespread
prevalence of file-sharing, since the mean number of files shared
per user consistently exceeds one hundred, while the median num-
ber of files shared per user is less than twenty. By providing only
the raw data used to calculate the mean, the network masks the
fact that a fifth of all users are providing the vast majority of the
content that is available for downloading."6
The applications not only provide information about the preva-
lence of file-sharers, they also reveal some useful information
about their users' preferences. The file-swapping networks bring
students have little privacy and file-sharing therefore may be quite visible, even in
real space.
62 Until recently, Gnutella applications did not allow a user to locate non-sharers on
the network-they were essentially invisible. On Kazaa/MusicCity, non-sharers are
exceedingly well camouflaged. To locate non-sharers on these networks, a user must
make content available for downloading, wait for other users to download the con-
tent, and then peek at the downloaders' shared directories during the transfer, or
shortly thereafter, to determine whether these users are sharing any files. That is the
methodology I employed in my study of the Kazaa network, and I can testify to its
cumbersome and tedious nature.
16 This statistic apparently includes the number of non-unique files being shared.
Thus, a thousand identical copies of the song "Piano Man" would be counted as a
thousand files being shared, not one file being shared.
16 See Miller, supra note 58, at 77.
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together file-swappers with similar tastes in copyrighted content,
thereby convincing new users that people just like them are mem-
bers of the file-swapping community. The software is designed to
underscore affinities among uploaders and downloaders and to
create empathy among anonymous users. Although users exchang-
ing files on the file-swapping networks are anonymous, their pref-
erences are not. When someone searches for music by the Camer-
oonian vocalist Henri Dikongue, he is necessarily searching for
users who, like him, enjoy that artist's work. While this commonal-
ity may be more meaningful to users who are interested in rela-
tively obscure artists like Dikongue, the affinity effect cannot be
discounted in building trust within a community of anonymous us-
ers."' By the same token, these affinities normalize file-swapping:
Members of the file-swapping networks stop being identified as
''rogue software pirates" and start being identified as "people who,
like me, have excellent musical taste."
The file-swapping networks also provide avenues of self-
expression for those particularly committed to the community of
file-swappers. The file-swapping networks generally contain discus-
sion forums and "Frequently Asked Questions" postings that pro-
vide the curious user with assistance in optimizing his use of the
networks.'66 My informal survey of postings in the forums revealed
that the individuals who responded to user queries in these discus-
sion groups tended to be those who are most committed to the suc-
165 See Peter J.D. Carnevale et al., Effects of Future Dependence, Liking, and Re-
peated Requests for Help on Helping Behavior, 45 Soc. Psychol. Q. 9, 12 (1982) (in-
troducing empirical research to suggest that even among individuals who have known
each other for only a few minutes, individuals were more likely to help those whom
they liked than those whom they did not like); Jane Allyn Piliavin & Hong-Wen
Charng, Altruism: A Review of Recent Theory and Research, 16 Ann. Rev. Soc. 27,
36, 47, 50 (1990) (presenting empirical evidence that affinity and empathy between
the donor and the donees engender increased helping behavior); Jane Sell et al., Are
Women More Cooperative Than Men in Social Dilemmas?, 56 Soc. Psychol. Q. 211,
214 (1993) ("Literature concerning one type of social dilemma-resource replenish-
ment-suggests that in-group identity helps to build cooperation.") (citation omitted);
cf. Jerome Rabow et al., Altruism in Drunk Driving Situations: Personal and Situ-
ational Factors in Intervention, 53 Soc. Psychol. Q. 199, 210 (1990) (discussing the im-
portance of affinities among intoxicated individuals and observers in prompting ob-
servers to intervene to prevent intoxicated persons from driving vehicles).
166 See, e.g., FAQ for BearShare, at http://www.bearshare.com/help/faq.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (posting re-
sponses to frequently asked questions about BearShare).
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cess of the network and, not coincidentally, the most dogmatic
supporters of file-swapping norms. '67 In these forums, there is a sig-
nificant disconnect between those most likely to post questions and
those most likely to answer those questions. The questioners will
by and large be new users who have not figured out how to opti-
mize their use of the file-swapping networks. The answerers will be
those repeat players who have successfully figured out these prob-
lems and care enough about the newer users to take the time to
read and respond to their postings. The question and answer fo-
rums therefore provide an excellent avenue for the old-timers (that
is, those most committed to the norm of sharing) to inculcate their
norms in the newest users.
It is worth noting further that these file-swapping network fo-
rums contain very little by way of dissent with respect to either the
propriety of file-swapping or the necessity of file-sharing. While
the file-swapping networks all contain chat rooms and discussion
forums, the number of people who join Kazaa/MusicCity for the
chat rooms and discussion fora is approximately equal to the num-
ber who read The Economist for the photographs. Quite simply,
only people looking for copyrighted content will go through the
trouble of running a Kazaa/MusicCity host. Because of this homo-
geneity, dissenting views regarding the propriety of their collective
file-swapping activity are almost never voiced.' Despite the fact
that anyone can log on to the networks, and that free speech is
generally encouraged, opinions expressed in the chat groups and
forums associated with file-swapping applications reveal almost to-
tal adherence to the "information-wants-to-be-free" orthodoxy.
67 See, e.g., Posting of Zeroshadow, Gnutella Forums: Gnutella Network
Discussion: being nice (etiquette), to gnutella.com, at http://www.gnutellaforums.com/
showthread.php?s=18602f5a72f0507e902dc801c84ba751&threadid=1988 (June 27,
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
" For a discussion of the consequences of increased homogeneity in subgroups on
the Internet, see Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of
American Community 177-79 (2000). For an examination of how limited exposure to
dissenting views can cause members of a group to adopt increasingly extreme view-
points, see Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
Yale L.J. 71, 89-90 (2000).
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C. Reinforcing Reciprocity
Technologies that magnify cooperative behavior and mask un-
cooperative behavior can succeed by tapping into deeply held so-
cial norms. In this instance, the file-swapping networks have been
successful in large part because they have managed to tap into in-
ternalized norms of reciprocity. Recall the passage from the "What
Is Gnutella?" screen quoted above: "The other half of Gnutella is
giving back. Almost everyone on GnutellaNet shares their stuff."'69
In the previous Section, I focused on the second sentence of that
excerpt, but the first sentence-"the other half of Gnutella is giving
back"-is also important. The networks' creators are drawing upon
reciprocal intuitions that their users are likely to possess. Once
again, the software is designed to exploit those intuitions.
Because of the peer-to-peer nature of file-swapping transactions,
it should be reasonably clear to most users of the networks that
their ability to obtain content depends on other users' willingness
to make their content available for downloading. Nevertheless, the
file-swapping applications make this relationship particularly ex-
plicit. Applications such as MusicCity and Kazaa display a user's
downloads and uploads from a given session on the same screen,
usually in two adjacent windows.'7 ° This juxtaposition of downloads
and uploads on the same screen cannot be altered by the user."'
Thus, to the extent that a user downloads much more than she up-
loads on a given day, the application will remind her of that imbal-
ance visibly. This image and the running tallies that accompany it
strongly suggest that a downloader has an obligation to give some-
thing back to the networks' members. In that subtle way, the file-
69 Kazaa's creators use similar language. See Sharing and the P2P Philosophy, Ka-
zaa.com, at http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/p2p-philosophy.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) ("Responsible shar-
ing is the cornerstone of a useful peer-to-peer experience. In order for everyone to
benefit from the collaboration, users need to share appropriate files. Successful peer-
to- eer is a two way street.").XGnutella applications are exceptional in this respect. On Gnutella, different tabs
denote uploads and downloads, so that a user may elect to look only at his download
screen without ever looking at his upload statistics.
... A user on MusicCity's Morpheus or Kazaa can increase or reduce the size of the
windows during a particular session, but these modifications cannot be saved. So,
while a user might shrink his upload screen into oblivion, the next time he logs in to
the network he will again see two adjacent screens of equal size: one for uploads and
the other for downloads.
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swapping applications tap further into norms of reciprocity that us-
ers bring with them to these networks.
172
During 2001, several Gnutella applications introduced a new fea-
ture that is a testament to the force behind the impulse to recipro-
cate. That feature allows users to choose to share their files only
with fellow users who are in turn sharing their files. It also allows
the user to specify the number of files that another user must be
sharing in order to gain access to the files in one's shared direc-
tory. 173 Thus, a user could elect to share his own files only with
those users who have at least one hundred files in their respective
shared directories. This innovation has the potential to constrain
the network's growth since it means that new users (who will likely
have few or no files available for sharing) could have a much
harder time locating desirable content. Its introduction also implic-
itly concedes that not everyone on GnutellaNet really is sharing
their stuff, thereby weakening the charismatic nature of Gnutella's
code. In order to justify introducing this option, the network's crea-
tors must have been motivated by two powerful countervailing in-
tuitions: (1) the instinct that users do care with whom they are
7 Earlier networks for trading copyrighted content built reciprocity rules into their
architecture and publicized reciprocity data as a means of encouraging cooperative
behavior. Roger Dingledine et al., Accountability, in Peer-to-Peer: Harnessing the
Benefits of a Disruptive Technology, supra note 7, at 271, 307 ("In the bulletin board
systems of the 1980s and early 1990s, one of the more important pieces of data about
a particular user was her upload/download ratio. Users with particularly low ratios
were derided as 'leeches,' because they consumed scarce system resources (remem-
ber, when one user was on via a phone line, no one else could log in) without giving
anything in return."). Some bulletin board systems required users to maintain a set
ratio of uploads to downloads if they wished to continue to enjoy the "privilege" of
downloading.
" The most recent Kazaa release contains a somewhat similar feature. When a user
downloads a file, her "participation level" is revealed, reflecting the extent of her
sharing. Users with higher participation levels now receive priority in downloading.
See Participation Level, Kazaa.com, at http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/
participationratio.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Re-
view Association). Unfortunately for Kazaa, computer programmers developed ap-
plications such as Kazaa Lite, which falsely reports that each Kazaa user is an extreme
sharer, enabling Kazaa Lite free-riders to jump to the head of the downloading queue.
This Article was written in 2001 and 2002, when encouraging voluntary cooperation
was the dominant strategy for peer-to-peer networks, but as the Article goes to press
in 2003, it appears that the networks are embracing a model of coerced cooperation. I




sharing their files; and (2) the insight that making this option avail-
able is likely to convince many of the network's free-riders to begin
sharing their files. In short, Gnutella programmers may have
looked at the Adar and Huberman study and concluded that coop-
eration on Gnutella was insufficient, and that an appeal to self-
interest would bring enough free-riders into the uploading fold to
justify the real costs of introducing this innovation. So far it is diffi-
cult to gauge what effect this innovation is having on the Gnutella
network, but my analysis suggests that the option of sharing only
with other sharers will prove to be a popular one.
Rhetoric matters too. Although the file-swapping networks en-
courage unlawful copyright infringement, the networks by no
means cede the moral high ground. In the parlance of the file-
swapping networks, those who infringe copyrights employ the lan-
guage of reciprocity. "Freeloaders" are not those who download
copyrighted content without paying for it, but those who download
content without uploading content to other users.174 Behaviors such
as making content that one has downloaded available to other
downloaders and labeling content accurately are consistent with a
broader societal norm of reciprocity-the golden rule."5 As I argue
below, because reciprocity is so strongly inculcated in most mem-
bers of society, file-sharing norms can piggyback on that meta-
norm. 176
174 See, e.g., Gnutella Forums: Options for Freeloading Prevention?, at
http://www.gnutellaforums.com/showthread.php?threadid=12038 (last visited Aug. 8,
2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (displaying postings of vari-
ous users); Gnutella Forums: Stop Freeloading, at http://www.gnutellaforums.com/
showthread.php?threadid=9558 (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association) (same). Those who favor strong intellectual property pro-
tections are more likely to use the term "freeloader" to refer to those users who are
distributing content for which they have not paid. See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Property
(and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217,220 (1996).
175 Shirky, supra note 7, at 33 ("As long as Napster users are able to find the songs
they want, they will continue to participate in the system, even if the people who
download songs from them are not the same people they download songs from.").
176 See infra Section III.D. See generally Lemley, supra note 63, at 1273 (arguing
that norms based on intuitively reciprocal behaviors are likely to be particularly effec-
tive); Major, supra note 108, at 83 ("Many non-digital social norms have greatly influ-
enced the evolution of social behavior in cyberspace."); Sugden, supra note 118, at 93
("If it is a matter of common knowledge that a particular convention is followed in
one situation, then that convention acquires prominence for other, analogous situa-
tions.").
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The file-swapping networks therefore are designed to reinforce
the two messages conveyed in the "What Is Gnutella?" excerpt:
"The other half of Gnutella is giving back. Almost everyone on
GnutellaNet shares their stuff." Translation: Those who download
should also upload, and virtually everyone on the networks up-
loads. The surprisingly high levels of sharing observed on these
networks are a testament to the subtle ways in which these online
spaces have been successful in reinforcing that message. Relatively
large numbers of file-swappers, and in some instances a majority,
have been persuaded that they ought to make some of their con-
tent available to strangers. Yet, so far an important premise has
gone unstated: There is an intuitive connection between the two
sentences quoted above. If everyone else is sharing, and if I am
benefiting from their sharing, then refusing to share does seem par-
ticularly problematic. But in an environment where an individual
will suffer no external sanctions if she chooses not to share, and can
fully harness the benefit of others' cooperation without sharing,
why does that connection arise? Put another way, the file-swapping
networks' charismatic code is working, but why?'
D. The Norm of Reciprocity in Loose-Knit Groups
The existing literature on social norms does a fine job of explain-
ing the emergence of social norms in close-knit groups. Analysis of
close-knit groups sheds light on the process by which file-
swapping's visible manifestations are becoming socially acceptable,
and one can tell a plausible story about how social pressures might
spur file-swapping behaviors using either Richard McAdams's es-
teem theory or Eric Posner's signaling theory.178 Thus, there is little
177 Charismatic code may play an important role in creating and internalizing social
norms among people in the other loose-knit environment I have studied in detail. Just
as Napster's charismatic code masked the uncooperative behavior of freeloaders, San
Diego's FasTrak program masked the behavior of drivers who were using tolllcarpool
lanes without authorization by making it more difficult to determine whether a solo
driver was using a carpool lane unlawfully. Strahilevitz, supra note 104, at 1259-60.
FasTrak also (unintentionally) utilized drivers who were participating in the program
to enforce the program's norms. Id. at 1257-58. Charismatic technologies that mask
uncooperative behavior and magnify cooperative behavior may therefore help en-
force social norms in varied loose-knit environments.
178 See supra note 118. McAdams might argue that by amassing large collections of
music and letting their real-world neighbors know they acquired them, file-swappers
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mystery about how the mass media's glorification of Shawn Fan-
ning might be related to the social acceptability of college students
trading homemade CDs consisting of unlicensed sound recordings,
or co-workers discussing the songs they have acquired via
Gnutella. Social norms, therefore, provide satisfactory tools to ex-
plain the apparent growing acceptability of file-swapping's mani-
festations in real space. 79
Social norms theory, so useful in real space, encounters difficul-
ties in cyberspace. Neither McAdams's nor Posner's theory can
adequately explain the emergence of cooperation among the loose-
demonstrate that they are (1) cultured (or at least in tune with pop culture), (2) indus-
trious, (3) on the cutting edge of technology, (4) appropriately frugal, and/or (5) will-
ing to embrace a counterculture. Regardless of which of these social meanings is
transmitted by file-swapping, the relevant social meaning is perceived as socially
beneficial, and so the underlying behavior is sanctioned or even encouraged by a file-
swapper's peers, neighbors, or co-workers. File-swappers therefore gain esteem as a
result of their file-swapping behavior-at least from its visible manifestations-and
the potential to earn this reward attracts more file-swappers.
Posner might assert that by engaging in file-swapping, an individual signals to others
his discount rate and his suitability for future cooperative transactions. So, for exam-
ple, an employee who divulges his file-swapping activities to his co-worker signals his
resourcefulness, technolQgical prowess, or knowledge of popular music. When that
co-worker subsequently seeks out the file-swapper to discuss music, hire him as a disc
jockey, or provide advice about new speakers available at a computer store, the file-
swapper's activities are reinforced.
" That is not to say that social norms provide the only satisfactory tool for explain-
ing such behaviors. It may be the case that the theory of loose-knit groups' social
norms articulated here provides a robust explanation for human behavior in certain
close-knit groups as well. Members of close-knit groups might adhere to close-knit
groups not out of concerns about being held in high esteem or enticing others to en-
gage in cooperative relations with one's self, but because of internal guilt about violat-
ing a rule to which everyone else appears to be adhering. The best test cases for such
a theory are those instances in which it is in the interest of a close-knit group's indi-
vidual member to violate a norm, and that member knows she can do so with zero risk
of being detected. In such situations, traditional accounts of social norm conformity
would have trouble explaining an individual's compliance with a norm, but theories
that focus on internalized feelings of guilt do not. In that sense, then, the norm viola-
tion might not be detected by a third party, but it is detected by the violator herself,
and that detection confers disutility on the violator. See generally Paul R. Amato,
Urban-Rural Differences in Helping Friends and Family Members, 56 Soc. Psychol.
Q. 249, 261 (1993) (arguing that norms of reciprocity in rendering assistance may be
more strongly adhered to in larger urban areas than in close-knit rural communities).
I intend to take up that issue in subsequent writings. For the time being, I adhere to
the plausible accounts put forth by Ellickson, Posner, and McAdams.
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knit community of users on the file-swapping networks. 8' Specifi-
cally, neither of these theories persuasively explains the prevalence of
cooperation in the face of anonymity. Although the cost of sharing
music is in some instances low, sharing is never costless, and a user
can download as much free music as she wants without sharing. Yet,
sharing behavior still emerges among a significant portion of the net-
works' users. Moreover, even where the cost of sharing is relatively
high-among users who have slow Internet connections or those us-
ers who share pornographic content, for example-file-sharing per-
sists."' In a loose-knit setting-an environment characterized by user
anonymity and a low likelihood of repeat player interactions-neither
" Traditionally, social norms scholarship has focused on norms arising among close-
knit groups, such as cattle ranchers in a rural county or merchants who can expect to
deal with each other in the future. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 5, at 177-78; Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1787-88 (1996). My scholarship
seeks to explain the development and enforcement of social norms in loose-knit envi-
ronments. See Strahilevitz, supra note 104, at 1273 & n.216 (studying commuters on
the San Diego highway system); Strahilevitz, supra note 5, at 359 (discussing the
emergence of social norms in a variety of loose-knit and intermediate-knit settings).
Analyses of social norms in loose-knit communities present daunting challenges and
highlight the limitations of the existing scholarship regarding the development of so-
cial norms. In response, it might be tempting for scholars to deem Napster, Gnutella,
urban freeways, and other loose-knit communities as environments in which social
norms as such do not arise. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory,
J. Econ. Persp., Fall 1989, at 99, 100:
[S]ocial norms differ from private norms, the self-imposed rules that people
construct to overcome weakness of will. Private norms, like social norms, are
non-outcome-oriented and sustained by feelings of anxiety and guilt. They are
not, however, sustained by the approval and disapproval of others since they
are not, or not necessarily, shared with others.
Id. (citation omitted). I disagree with such a characterization. My argument is that
members of the loose-knit file-swapping networks cooperate with each other largely
because the networks' creators give their users a distorted picture of the community-
one likely to harness deeply engrained norms of reciprocity. Those norms are private
in the sense that they are internally enforced-through file-swappers' desire to avoid
feelings of guilt and selfishness or to experience the warm glow associated with group
solidarity. While these norms are enforced and internalized differently than social
norms in close-knit groups, they are no less powerful, and they are by no means non-
social.
"' See Adar & Huberman, supra note 69 (presenting data to support the hypothesis that
"the speed of a peer's internet connection will not influence the likelihood to free-ride");
supra text accompanying note 92 (discussing the wide availability of pornography on peer-
to-peer networks).
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esteem theory nor signaling can explain this behavioral regularity. '82
Classical economics is also at a loss.'
83
"" Indeed, one study of the prevalence of altruistic acts found that in the pre-Napster
world, helping strangers was the exception, rather than the rule. Paul R. Amato, Personal-
ity and Social Network Involvement as Predictors of Helping Behavior in Everyday Life,
53 Soc. Psychol. Q. 31, 34 (1990) ("Overall it is apparent that most of the helping was pro-
vided to familiar others; complete strangers accounted respectively for only 11 percent and
9 percent of the helping behaviors reported by students and by nonstudents."). That was
true even though the study included as "helping" such low-cost steps as opening a door for
someone who has his hands full, giving the time of day to someone, and holding an eleva-
tor door open for someone who wants to get inside before the doors close. Id. app. at 41-
42. Social psychologists also argue that the motivations for and impediments to seeking
help from strangers are quite different from those involved with seeking help from friends
or family members. E. Gary Shapiro, Is Seeking Help from a Friend Like Seeking
Help from a Stranger?, 43 Soc. Psychol. Q. 259, 262 (1980).
'8- See Robert Sugden, Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary
Contributions, 94 Econ. J. 772, 773-74 (1984); see also Lunney, supra note 155, at
859-60 ("As part of the development of the free-rider concept, economists often be-
gin with the assumption that each consumer makes decisions to maximize her utility
based a narrow view of rational self-interest .... [E]conomists have ... recognized
that these assumptions are unlikely to prove generally accurate. Self-sacrifice, coop-
eration, and charitable contribution, just to name a few examples, are all extremely
common and tend to refute.., to some extent, the free-rider theory.").
Robyn Dawes and Richard Thaler identify several instances in which people behave
altruistically even though their essential anonymity would allow them to free-ride
without suffering any social sanctions. "Public television successfully raises enough
money from viewers to continue to broadcast. The United Way and other charities
receive contributions from many if not most citizens. Even when dining at a restau-
rant away from home in a place never likely to be visited again, most patrons tip the
server." Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, J. Econ.
Persp., Summer 1988, at 187, 188. These instances are interesting, but the case of file-
sharing is perhaps even more puzzling. After all, one common thread for PBS, the
United Way, and restaurant waiters is that they need money, probably more than the
donor needs money. PBS's annual struggle to meet its budget is well-documented in
its pledge campaigns; the United Way provides funding to organizations who seek to
accomplish good works and help those most in need; and waiters and waitresses are
generally poorer than their customers, and it is widely understood that they "live off"
their tips. Similarly, the recipients of blood donations all need blood. From these ex-
amples, sociologists have generalized that altruism is largely dependent on the recipi-
ent's need for assistance. See C. Daniel Batson, Prosocial Motivation: Is it Ever Truly
Altruistic?, 20 Advances Experimental Soc. Psychol. 65, 95 (1987); William Howard
& William D. Crano, Effects of Sex, Conversation, Location, and Size of Observer
Group on Bystander Intervention in a High Risk Situation, 37 Sociometry 491, 504
(1974). But cf. R. Lance Shotland & Charles A. Stebbins, Emergency and Cost as De-
terminants of Helping Behavior and the Slow Accumulation of Social Psychological
Knowledge, 46 Soc. Psychol. Q. 36, 38-39 (1983) (finding that while the recipient's
"need" for help did not affect a potential helper's propensity to render assistance, the
potential helper was more likely to render assistance if he perceived the situation as
an emergency). When a file-sharer makes a file available to everyone on the Gnutella
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In proposing that charismatic code accounts for the prevalence
of file-sharing on the file-swapping networks, I attempt to provide
an alternative explanation for the creation of norms in loose-knit
communities. That explanation suggests that when users are pre-
sented with an image of a community in which cooperation is mag-
nified and noncooperation is masked by charismatic code, users are
more likely to cooperate. This "monkey-see, monkey-do" phe-
nomenon has intuitive appeal." All that phrase does, however, is
describe a phenomenon; it cannot explain it. For the explanation, it
is necessary to turn to the sociological and social psychology litera-
ture.
This literature introduces the notion of a "norm of reciproc-
ity."' The idea is a simple one. Under a norm of reciprocity, when
A helps B, B feels obligated to return the favor, either by helping
network, he necessarily gives it away to both those starving students who cannot af-
ford to purchase a licensed copy and those middle-aged yuppies who could easily af-
ford to buy the album but prefer to get it for free. In short, a file-sharer's altruism is
need-neutral. File-swapping is in that sense more akin to intentionally leaving a
twenty dollar bill on the sidewalk than to donating twenty dollars to the Salvation
Army. That said, even though the contribution is need-neutral, individual users may
assume that the beneficiaries of their largesse are like themselves and, therefore, wor-
thy of receiving free music. See supra text accompanying note 165 (discussing affinity
effects). Indeed, where a recipient of altruistic assistance is completely anonymous,
the donor may even be inclined to imagine the recipient as particularly needy, per-
haps because doing so maximizes the psychic benefits associated with the altruistic
act. See J. Keith Murnighan et al., The Volunteer Dilemma, 38 Admin. Sci. Q. 515,
535 (1993).
" An example with which many will be familiar illustrates that the charismatic
technologies I discuss in this Article are not entirely new-they are just more sophis-
ticated than previous versions. During the 1970s, situation comedies typically intro-
duced "laugh tracks" onto the sound tracks of their television programs, cuing re-
corded laughter after every punch line. The theory was that viewers at home would be
more likely to laugh if they heard others laughing along with them. These hackneyed
technologies fell out of favor after listeners became able to discern the difference be-
tween laugh tracks and an actual studio audience. Today, many comedy programs pay
audience members to show up and provide real laughter, albeit with much prodding
from stage managers. Although the analogy is imperfect, we can conceptualize char-
ismatic code as an extremely sophisticated laugh track that makes the program seem
much funnier than it actually is.
"85 Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 Am.
Soc. Rev. 161 (1960), is generally regarded as having initiated this literature. Survey-
ing the literature, Elinor Ostrom concludes "that humans [likely] inherit a strong ca-
pacity to learn reciprocity norms" and that "[r]eciprocity is a basic norm taught in all
societies." Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of
Collective Action, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 10 (1998).
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A, or by helping C (a third party, albeit one who shares at least
some relevant characteristic with A).' The norm is by no means
limited to three-person interactions, and scholars have begun to
study its application to much larger groups of individuals, such as a
nation's taxpayers."7 As the authors of this literature have recog-
nized, the norm of reciprocity is sufficiently powerful that the
founding members of a new community are likely to bring it with
them into that community and see it potentially flourish therein.'88
If the file-swapping example is illustrative, these reciprocity norms
861 borrow this definition, not from Gouldner, but from Takahashi. Nobuyuki Ta-
kahashi, The Emergence of Generalized Exchange, 105 Am. J. Soc. 1105, 1108 (2000)
("Once an actor receives resources, she is obligated to return to someone else in the
future."). Takahashi has referred to the situation where A helps B and B helps A as
"restricted exchange," and the situation where A helps B and B helps C as "general-
ized exchange." Id. at 1106; see also Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, Evolution of
Indirect Reciprocity by Image Scoring, 393 Nature 573, 573 (1998) (presenting a
model showing how generalized exchange, which they dub "indirect reciprocity,"
might arise through evolutionary processes); Theo Van Tilburg et al., The Measure-
ment of Reciprocity in Ego-Centered Networks of Personal Relationships: A Com-
parison of Various Indices, 54 Soc. Psychol. Q. 54, 55 (1991) (discussing indirect recip-
rocity). File-swapping consists almost entirely of generalized exchange.
187 Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 333, 340-43
(2001). Truman Bewley has argued persuasively that reciprocity explains corporate
managers' general reluctance to reduce employees' wages. See Truman Bewley, Fair-
ness, Reciprocity, and Wage Rigidity (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1383, Oct.
2002), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d13b/d1383.pdf.
" See Gouldner, supra note 185, at 176 ("[T]he norm is not only in some sense a
defense or stabilizing mechanism but is also what may be called a 'starting mecha-
nism.' That is, it helps to initiate social interaction and is functional in the early phases
of certain groups before they have developed a differentiated and customary set of
status duties."); sources cited supra note 176; see also Michael W. Macy, PAVLOV
and the Evolution of Cooperation: An Experimental Test, 58 Soc. Psychol. Q. 74, 78
(1995) ("Norms of reciprocity and conformity pose a start-up problem: if contribution
requires moral or social pressure, and if this pressure increases with the rate of
contribution, what gets the system started? One possibility, Elster suggests, is the
'everyday Kantian' norm to act as you would have others act. This avoids the start-up
problem because the obligation to cooperate does not depend on the extent of coop-
eration by others in the group."). Recent research suggests that when two players
both cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma situation, portions of their brains associated
with the production of pleasurable sensations are activated. See James K. Rilling et
al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 Neuron 395, 395-403 (2002).
Revealingly, some of the same brain areas were not activated when the subjects were
told they were cooperating with a computer in a prisoner's dilemma game. Id. at 398.
Because all subjects in the research were adults, the study does not resolve the
question of whether these neurological benefits from cooperation are learned or
innate. For an interesting discussion of that question, see Neven Sesardic, Recent
Work on Human Altruism and Evolution, 106 Ethics 128 (1995).
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may also cause people to engage in cooperative behaviors of the
illegal variety.
1. File-Sharing as Guilt Alleviation
Under the most plausible explanation for reciprocal exchange,
file-swappers elect to make their own files available for others to
download based on what Sally Ann Shumaker and James S. Jack-
son have dubbed the "aversive effects of nonreciprocated bene-
fits." '89 Drawing on a number of experimental studies, Shumaker
and Jackson argue that when an individual receives a benefit that
obviously results from the cooperation of others, she internalizes a
feeling of indebtedness. "Reciprocation... serves as one method
available to a recipient for alleviating the tension produced by the
indebted state."'' The best way to remove these feelings of guilt is
for her to reciprocate directly. Failing that, however, Shumaker
and Jackson found qualified support for the theory that someone
"prevented from directly reciprocating the donor will help a third
person."'"' Conducting their own experiment, the researchers de-
termined that while subjects who had been helped by others but
were unable to reciprocate reported feeling guilty,'"
[those] who were provided with an opportunity to benefit a third
person did not report feelings of guilt or unease .... These data
are the first to support this study's hypothesis that reciprocating a
third person may relieve at least some of the tensions produced
by being placed in an aversive state.193
189Sally Ann Shumaker & James S. Jackson, The Aversive Effects of Nonrecipro-
cated Benefits, 42 Soc. Psychol. Q. 148 (1979).
'
9
' Id. at 149 (citing M. Greenberg, A Theory of Indebtedness, in Social Exchange:
Advances in Theory and Research (K.J. Gergen et al. eds., 1980)). Shumaker and
Jackson's study casts doubt on an alternative explanation-that those who are helped
experience improved moods as a result, and that being in a good mood makes one
more likely to help others. Id. at 155-57.
... Id. at 149.
... Id. at 156.
193 Id. A subsequent study provided further support for this conclusion. Amato, su-
pra note 182, at 40 ("The finding that help received from friends and family was asso-
ciated with spontaneous helping (mainly to strangers) is curious. It may reflect gener-
alized reciprocity; that is, people who receive a good deal of help through their
networks may feel a general obligation that can be discharged partly by helping any-
one-including strangers.") (citation omitted).
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Thus, the authors concluded that while helping a third person may
not alleviate guilt as much as direct reciprocation, it is the next best
thing. 94 Research by Shumaker and Jackson's peers has resulted in
similar findings.9 5 Indeed, the aversive effects of nonreciprocated
benefits are likely to be particularly pronounced among anony-
mous strangers.196 By offsetting the guilt that accompanies purely
selfish downloading, file-sharing helps network members maintain
a positive sense of self: They conceive of themselves as sharers,
team players, members of a community of sorts, and cooperators."97
' Shumaker & Jackson, supra note 189, at 157.
'9' See Daniel Bar-Tal et al., Reciprocity Behavior in the Relationship Between Do-
nor and Recipient and Between Harm-Doer and Victim, 40 Sociometry 293, 298
(1977) (describing the feelings of indebtedness and obligation to reciprocate after re-
ceiving assistance.); Martin S. Greenberg & Solomon P. Shapiro, Indebtedness: An
Adverse Aspect of Asking for and Receiving Help, 34 Sociometry 290, 290-300
(1971) (describing a study that showed participants were less likely to ask for help
when they did not anticipate being able to reciprocate); Roberta G. Simmons et al.,
The Self-Image of Unrelated Bone Marrow Donors, 34 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 285,
291 (1993) ("Donating bone marrow was seen as indirect reciprocation, a token of
gratitude for their own good fortune.") (citation omitted); see also Paula F. Levin &
Alice M. Isen, Further Studies on the Effect of Feeling Good on Helping, 38 Sociome-
try 141 (1975) (proposing that people help strangers after receiving help from an
anonymous stranger because receiving help put them in a good mood, but presenting
data consistent with an aversive effects explanation for helping). The study of bone
marrow donors presents one of the better case studies by researchers seeking to un-
derstand why people would help strangers. In the case of bone marrow donations, the
costs of donating are relatively high, consisting of pain, recovery time, and the risk of
complications from the procedure. Simmons et al., supra, at 287. As a result, the
population of bone marrow donors was unusually altruistic, and quite unlike a ran-
dom sample of the population. Id. at 290. Like file-swappers, bone marrow donors
made sacrifices (albeit much greater ones) to help people they had never met.
196 See Bar-Tal et al., supra note 195, at 297 ("Individuals tend to feel most gratitude
when they are helped by acquaintances or strangers and least gratitude when they are
helped by parents or siblings."); Shapiro, supra note 182, at 262 ("[F]riends are rela-
tively unaffected by temporary imbalances in their relationship since they have con-
tinuing exchanges and their past histories are generally equitable. Strangers, having
no past histories nor expectations of future interaction, may find temporary imbal-
ances much more disturbing.").
, ' It is unclear whether the brain registers the pleasure associated with the avoid-
ance of guilt and the pleasure associated with feeling good about helping another dif-
ferently. Rilling et al., supra note 188, at 400. 1 have characterized guilt avoidance as
the primary mechanism motivating cooperation because that hypothesis seems to
have the most support, but subsequent research might suggest that humans affirma-
tively enjoy cooperating more than they dislike non-cooperation. Bibb Latane and
James M. Dabbs considered both the guilt-avoidance and pleasure-seeking explana-
tions for why people help strangers and concluded that the view "that people help
others reluctantly in order to avoid feeling bad, is probably the most popular in
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They derive satisfaction from maintaining these positive self-
images."'
Notably, reciprocation does not require a one-to-one relation-
ship between the benefit received and the benefit conferred on an-
other. Rather, smaller gestures may suffice to alleviate the aversive
effects accompanying the receipt of valuable benefits from a
stranger, and in some cases the reciprocation can take a different
form from the receipt of the benefit. ' Thus, a user who recipro-
cates his 100 downloads by permitting twenty uploads may well ex-
tinguish the guilt that accompanied the act of downloading. More-
over, in many instances where a file-sharer has downloaded 100
files but has only made twenty available, reciprocity levels might
well approach a one-to-one ratio because a user need only
download a file once, but it can be downloaded from him ad infini-
tum once it is in his shared directory. A user who has made one-
fifth of his collection available for downloading might be engaged
in one-to-one reciprocity if his shared songs are downloaded an av-
erage of five times each. An uploaded file can be the gift that keeps
on giving.
The "aversive effects" model therefore provides one plausible
explanation for why users of these networks make their files avail-
able despite the absence of economic incentives to do so. Napster,
Gnutella, and the other file-swapping networks all operate on the
third party helping model described in the Shumaker and Jackson
study. Specifically, because a file transfer can be initiated only at
the downloader's request, opportunities to upload a file to some-
one from whom a file-swapper has just downloaded are extremely
American social science today." Bibb Latane & James M. Dabbs, Jr., Sex, Group
Size, and Helping in Three Cities, 38 Sociometry 180, 190 (1975); cf. Dawes & Thaler,
supra note 183, at 192 ("Another type of altruism that has been postulated to explain
cooperation is that involved in the act of cooperating itself, as opposed to its results.
'Doing the right (good, honorable,... ) thing' is clearly a motive for many people.
Sometimes termed impure altruism, it generally is described as satisfaction of con-
science, or of noninstrumental ethical mandates."); Piliavin & Charng, supra note 165,
at 32 (discussing the important connection between altruism and an individual's self-
image).
198 See Simmons et al., supra note 195, at 287-97.
See Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 300; see also Amato, supra note 179,
at 254 (presenting the results of a study showing that people consistently overestimate
the amount of help they have given others and underestimate the amount of help they
have received from others).
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limited. File-swapping networks therefore provide their members
with the opportunity to do the next best thing-make their files
available for third parties to download. File-swappers need not up-
load as many files as they download. Instead, their reciprocal in-
stincts will often be satisfied by engaging in minor to moderate file-
sharing with others.
It generally will not suffice for a user to make his files available
to just any third party. Under the guilt alleviation theory, a user
will prefer to return the favor to someone who is similar, in the
relevant respect, to the donor whose largesse the user earlier re-
ceived. He knows that the donor has made his files available to
others for downloading, so the user will feel better about his up-
loading if he believes that the recipient is also a file-sharer. If a
user perceives that many of those downloading files from him are
not passing those files along to others, his desire to reciprocate will
no longer be satisfied through participation in the network. As
Dawes and Thaler hypothesize, "people have a tendency to coop-
erate until experience shows that those with whom they are inter-
acting are taking advantage of them. '2"" By magnifying the extent
of file-sharing on the network and masking the prevalence of non-
sharing, charismatic code attempts to persuade the individual file-
sharer that the beneficiaries of his generosity are just as deserving
as the people from whom he acquired his content. Charismatic
code therefore avoids the extinguishment of reciprocity obligations
among its more cooperative users."'
These studies of cooperation among anonymous strangers pro-
vide a persuasive psychological account of what motivates users of
2 Dawes & Thaler, supra note 183, at 191.
It is possible that another guilt-alleviation story is working in the background.
Perhaps some file-swappers feel somewhat guilty about violating copyright laws but
manage to eliminate those feelings of guilt by sharing files. See supra note 145 and
accompanying text (noting that fifty-four percent of downloaders have "some reserva-
tions" about obtaining free music off the Internet). To be sure, sharing compounds
the illegality, but because sharing and cooperation are generally seen as positive be-
haviors, such file-sharing might ameliorate the guilty pleasures associated with
downloading. Cf. Scott Rosenberg, But Isn't it Against the Law?, Salon.com, at
http://archive.salon.com/tech/col/rose/2000/08/07/breaking-law/print.htm (Aug. 7,
2000) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) ("People are giving stuff
away-they're sharing files for free. That's one of the big reasons, I think, that mil-
lions of people don't see anything wrong with using Napster. It doesn't feel like theft;
it feels like a great big communal swap meet. ").
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peer-to-peer networks to upload their files. Yet these experiments
differ from the peer-to-peer situation in one important respect:
While the participants in various experiments were anonymous,
they were permitted face-to-face contact, which allowed for greater
empathy. Elinor Ostrom describes a consensus view among schol-
ars that participants in a public good provision experiment are sig-
nificantly more likely to cooperate if they are allowed face-to-face
communication than if they are required to communicate with each
other via computer terminals.2' Seen in this light, the reasonably
high levels of cooperation observed on MusicCity are even more
startling.
Whatever the experiments say, robust cooperation can and does
emerge among anonymous members of a computer network in the
real world. Why the divergence between the studies and the real
world evidence? Two interesting possibilities spring to mind. The
first possibility is that charismatic code and the very large numbers
of sharers visible on these networks overwhelm the users' reluc-
tance to cooperate with unseen individuals. The second possibility
is that as users become increasingly familiar with the Internet, and
have their social experiences increasingly mediated through the
Internet, they develop a greater sense of empathy with anonymous,
unseen users. Thus, a user who has grown up participating in Inter-
net chat rooms may feel just as much discomfort free-riding on the
cooperation of other anonymous users as she would if she con-
fronted those users face-to-face. Under this hypothesis, if one
tested Kazaa's users in a cooperation experiment, they would
choose cooperative strategies more frequently than those members
of the general population who formed the pool for the various co-
operation experiments cited by Ostrom.
2. Reciprocity Cascades
Once the file-swapping networks succeed in tapping into the re-
ciprocity norms that their users bring to cyberspace, the networks
can rely on several factors to further solidify file-sharing behaviors.
202 See Ostrom, supra note 185, at 6-7 (reviewing the literature on these kinds of ex-
periments).
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Cooperation tends to engender more cooperation,"' although there
are several complementary explanations for why this is so.
First, when a file-swapper is exposed to the widespread file-
sharing of his fellow computer users, his own propensity to file-
share will be reinforced. Imitation is not only the most sincere form
of flattery, it also validates and solidifies the behavior of the person
who is being imitated.'" The feedback effects created by multitudes
of computer users imitating each other can spark a cascade of imi-
tation that reinforces a behavioral norm even in the absence of so-
cial sanctions directed against nonconformists."5 Relatedly, visible
sharing can make sharers out of members who have just joined a
network."
Second, when users try to assess the levels of file-sharing that ex-
ist on the networks, they are likely to assume that the majority of
network users behave as they do. Psychologists have observed that
members of a network generally use their own level of coopera-
tiveness as a heuristic for helping them estimate the cooperative-
ness of others in that network."7 File-sharers will thus tend to over-
estimate the extent of file-sharing on the network, and those who
only download will tend to underestimate the extent of file-sharing
on the network. By magnifying cooperation and masking noncoop-
eration, the creators of the file-swapping networks attempt to con-
firm the hunch that solidifies reciprocal propensities among file-
sharers. The user is inclined to believe that most network members
will share. He then logs in to the network and sees that quite a lot
203 Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577, 1589-90 (2000); Sugden, supra note 183, at
774-75,783.
204 See Michael C. Roberts, On Being Imitated: Effects of Levels of Imitation and
Imitator Competence, 43 Soc. Psychol. Q. 233, 233 (1980) ("[M]odels are attracted to
an imitator and tend to subsequently imitate those people who first imitate them ....
[I]mitation is a form of behavioral similarity which provides consensual validation and
thus decreases uncertainty and unpredictability in the model. This then makes the
model more confident of an attitude or behavior .....
20. See id. at 239.
206 See also Piliavin & Charng, supra note 165, at 41 ("Experimental studies have
consistently shown that children display greater generosity when they are exposed to
generous models than to selfish models.") (citations omitted).
207 See Tomonori Morikawa et al., The Advantage of Being Moderately Coopera-
tive, 89 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 601, 601 (1995); John Orbell & Robyn M. Dawes, A "Cog-
nitive Miser" Theory of Cooperators' Advantage, 85 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 515, 515, 517
(1991); Takahashi, supra note 186, at 1130.
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of members are sharing content,"8 and consequently he feels that
his initial intuition has been validated. 9
Third, increased cooperation among members of a network or-
dinarily engenders increased benefits for the cooperators. 21 This
presumption is particularly true in the case of file-swapping, in
which more cooperators means more new content and more
sources for obtaining that content. As a file-swapping network thus
comes to be characterized by increased levels of file-sharing, par-
ticipation in the network becomes increasingly attractive for file-
sharers.21 1 Success of a file-swapping network breeds more success,
as file-swappers obtain more valuable benefits from participation
and hence feel more need to reciprocate. Reciprocity cascades
therefore engender material rewards in addition to psychic bene-
fits.
20 The Gnutella networks arguably do a better job of exploiting bounded rationality
to create an appearance of widespread sharing than networks such as Kazaa. When a
user types in a search request to Gnutella, the search will keep running indefinitely,
and the list of matching files will continue to scroll down the screen. Kazaa, by con-
trast, defaults to show no more than 100 or so matching files.
29 Cf. Ostrom, supra note 185, at 12 ("[R]eciprocators are likely to be more optimis-
tic about finding others following the same norm and disproportionately enter more
voluntary social dilemmas than nonreciprocators. Given both propensities, the feed-
back from such voluntary activities will generate confirmatory evidence that they
have adopted a norm which serves them well over the long run."). There is anecdotal
evidence to suggest that some community members are likely to cooperate when they
see that no one else is cooperating and when they know that their own cooperative
acts will engender significant benefits for the group or its members. This helps explain
the existence of heroically cooperative acts, such as gentiles' harboring of Jews in
Nazi-occupied Europe during the Second World War. See Kristen R. Monroe et al.,
Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, 101
Ethics 103, 112-13 (1990). Even if that anecdotal evidence is indicative of a general
trend, it is not inconsistent with the theory of cooperation relied upon in this Article.
The propensity to cooperate may still be a function of the number of cooperators per-
ceived by someone who must decide whether to cooperate, but the relationship be-
tween perceived cooperation and the propensity to cooperate would be parabolic
rather than linear. The instinct to cooperate is therefore initially high when no one
else visibly cooperates, slopes downward dramatically when a few members in a large
group are seen to be cooperating, and slopes upward dramatically as perceived coop-
eration increases and reciprocity instincts are triggered.
210 See Atip Asvanund et al., An Empirical Analysis of Network Externalities in P2P
Music-Sharing Networks 1-4, 7 (Carnegie Mellon Univ. H. John Heinz Sch. of Pub.
Policy and Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2002-37, July 2002), available at
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/detail.jsp?id=4256.
2 See Sugden, supra note 183, at 781-82.
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There is, of course, a corollary to the notion of reciprocity cas-
cades. Just as cooperation can engender more cooperation, nonco-
operation can snowball. Particularly when noncooperative behav-
ior becomes malicious and harms cooperators, antisocial behaviors
can reverberate throughout a network, punishing the innocent, and
causing the innocent to punish the equally innocent."2
Even outside the context of computer networks and reciprocity
norms, scholars have found that when community members falsely
perceive particular practices to be widespread, they are likely to
conform their own behavior to the way they believe others are be-
having. The leading work in this area is that of H. Wesley Perkins,
who has documented the phenomenon of college students persis-
tently overestimating their peers' levels of alcohol consumption,
and has argued persuasively that these persistent misperceptions
fuel more alcohol consumption than there would be otherwise. '3 In
the case of alcohol consumption, the most inebriated people tend
to be the most visible in social settings such as campus parties. This
visibility suggests that there is a norm of binge drinking, and ten-
dencies to adhere to that perceived norm cause more students to
become severely intoxicated.214 By the same token, those students
who are not intoxicated are less visible and less likely to be the sub-
ject of after-the-fact conversations.21' Perkins writes:
With the accumulation of conversation over time, certain college
social events get the reputation (often encouraged by the spon-
212 Bar-Tal et al., supra note 195, at 293 ("Recently, several investigators have ex-
tended the principle of reciprocity that is applied in helping situations to contexts in
which harm-doing occurs. The results of these studies have suggested that, in general,
individuals tend to reciprocate harm done to them.") (citation omitted). Bar-Tal et al.
point to one potential constraint on anti-cooperation cascades in loose-knit environ-
ments. Id. at 297 ("[I]ndividuals tend to feel most resentment when they are harmed
byuparents or siblings and least resentment when they are harmed by strangers.").
H. Wesley Perkins, College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and Other Drug
Norms Among Peers: Exploring Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Preven-
tion Programs, in Designing Alcohol and Other Drug Prevention Programs in Higher
Education: Bringing Theory into Practice 177, 183-94 (1997). Perkins's data shows
that while only nineteen percent of students at a liberal arts college said they viewed
frequent intoxication as acceptable even if it interfered with other responsibilities,
sixty-three percent perceived that view as the dominant one among their fellow stu-
dents. Id. at 184.
214 Id. at 190.
215 Id. at 190-91.
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sors) that "everyone goes" and "everyone gets smashed." Thus a
sensationalized view of the college community emerges. This
powerful mythology has a life of its own and actually encourages
more students to attend parties and get drunk than might other-
wise do so.216
Misperceptions regarding levels of alcohol consumption therefore
can become "self-fulfilling prophe[sies]" and can snowball as visi-
ble intoxication fuels misperception, which in turn fuels more in-
toxication.217 Universities have paid attention to Perkins's scholar-
ship, and when they have implemented educational programs that
attempt to correct misperceptions of alcohol consumption, they
have generally seen significant decreases in the prevalence and se-
verity of intoxication episodes. Campus programs that credibly
publicized the lower-than-expected incidence of binge drinking
have lowered the prevalence of overconsumption dramatically.218
3. Holdouts
What explains why some users who download do not become
file-sharers? Several behavioral factors might overcome the recip-
rocity norms outlined above. For some individuals, the increased
cost of uploading, or the risk of adverse consequences resulting
from uploading, will dominate the reciprocity norms that would
urge them to share.219 Some individuals will have less well-
developed senses of reciprocity; it is clear that individuals internal-
216 Id. at 191.
217 Id. at 192.
218 See Michael P. Haines, A Social Norms Approach to Preventing Binge Drinking
at Colleges and Universities 11 (1996); Perkins, supra note 213, at 194. A similar dy-
namic emerges when taxpayers are informed that, contrary to what they might be-
lieve, the overwhelming majority of taxpayers do not cheat on their taxes. Taxpayers
in Minnesota who received letters referencing the pervasiveness of compliance with
tax laws paid their taxes at higher rates than did members of a control group. Stephen
Coleman, Minn. Dep't of Revenue, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experi-
ment: State Tax Results 18-19, 25 (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/
reports/complnce.pdf.
" See, e.g., Ramayya Krishnan et al., The Virtual Commons: Why Free-Riding Can
Be Tolerated in File Sharing Networks 2 (Carnegie Mellon Univ. H. John Heinz Sch.
of Pub. Policy and Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2002-36, Jan. 2002), available at
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/detail.jsp?id--4255 ("While users share downloaded
content, by default, they can and frequently do turn off this feature to economize on their
own private allocation of bandwidth.").
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ize and act upon even these widespread norms to varying de-
grees.22° Other downloaders, despite the better efforts of the net-
work creators, will not view uploading as "helping," and therefore
will not conceptualize the acquisition of content as a favor that re-
quires repayment.22 ' Finally, some downloaders will conclude,
based on the large number of other downloaders making their con-
tent available, that there is more than enough content to go
around, even without their efforts. In social psychology this phe-
nomenon is referred to as the "bystander effect," and its propensity
to discourage altruism has been well documented, especially in
those situations where the costs of helping are high.222 Indeed,
charitable organizations conducting fund raisers must constantly
walk a fine line between extolling the virtues of achieving an ambi-
tious goal and appearing not to need the contributions of the indi-
vidual being solicited. Hence fund-raising letters might contain
schizophrenic language such as "last year we raised a record $5 mil-
lion for our school, but this year it's more important than ever that
you join your fellow alumni in contributing to this worthy cause."
Such language plays on the recipient's desire to participate in a
successful cooperative endeavor and reminds him that bad things
will happen if he withholds his contribution.23 The same is true on
the file-swapping networks: Some users are motivated to cooperate
when exposed to the purported ubiquity of file-sharing, while oth-
ers feel less guilty about free-riding.
220 See Piliavin & Charng, supra note 165, at 32.
221 Greenberg & Shapiro, supra note 195, at 291 ("It must be pointed out, however,
that reciprocation is neither the only mode nor necessarily the preferred mode for re-
ducing indebtedness. The individual can reduce the magnitude of indebtedness by
cognitively restructuring the situation. For example, he might devalue the help re-
ceived and/or increase the magnitude of his costs and the donor's rewards for giv-
22 Howard & Crano, supra note 183, at 493, 501-02; Latane & Dabbs, supra note
197, at 185-88; Piliavin & Charng, supra note 165, at 35.
2. I have heard National Public Radio stations report that only ten percent of their
listening audience contributes during membership drives. At the same time, National
Public Radio supplies anecdotal evidence to suggest that "listeners like you" are con-
tributing: hence, the audible ringing of telephones in the background during appeals
for contributions, and the publication of donors' names and hometowns over the air-
waves.
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4. Alternative Explanations
As this discussion of holdouts suggests, the user population of
the file-swapping networks is hardly monolithic. Some file-sharers
will be motivated by strong reciprocity urges; for others, the desire
to reciprocate will be too weak to overcome the costs of sharing.
That said, it is worth exploring some alternative explanations for
file-sharing on these networks to determine whether they are con-
sistent with the observed cooperation.
One possible explanation for file-sharing is that individuals are
engaging in that behavior because they derive satisfaction from
thumbing their collective noses at the recording industry and other
copyright holders.22 ' Along the same lines, these users might have
some taste for rebellion against the law and gain utility from flout-
ing it. According to this reasoning, file-sharing is a type of civil dis-
obedience directed against those entities that improperly use the
copyright laws to siphon off revenue that rightly belongs to artists.
While this type of sentiment may have helped motivate the crea-
tors of these file-swapping networks to release their software to the
public, it is unlikely that most of the file-sharers on the network
share their files because of such feelings. After all, my data sug-
gests that the majority of the file-sharers on the Kazaa/MusicCity
network engaged in low-level sharing-making no more than a few
CDs worth of music available to the network's users.225 If file-
sharers make their content available because of a desire to harm
copyright holders' economic interests, or because of a taste for
breaking copyright laws, then one would expect them to share their
entire collections of MP3 files rather than just a small portion of
their collections.226
24 See, e.g., Michael Goldberg, 20 Million Napster Fans Can't be Wrong, Insider-
One, at http://insiderone.net/drama/drama003.html (Aug. 14, 2000) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association) ("Like smoking a joint or chugging a six-pack, us-
ing Napster lets a 1 5-year-old give mom and dad the finger and express solidarity with
fellow members of what Spin has called 'Generation Mook.' But it's not just the kids
who are ripping off the copyright holders. I know one 45-year-old man who's filled his
hard drive with music he hasn't paid for. He's not rebelling. He says he's a victim of a
corporate music business that charges too much for music.").
22 See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
226 My data on the types of sound recordings downloaded by Kazaa/MusicCity's us-
ers suggests that there are not broad cultural differences in the levels of sharing
prevalent on the network. For example, those who downloaded Spanish language
Virginia Law Review
Sharing a portion of one's MP3 collection is consistent with a re-
ciprocity story,"' but inconsistent with an antipathy/civil disobedi-
ence story. Because the population of users who share their entire
MP3 collection with others appears to be relatively small, and be-
cause acceptance of the Kazaa/MusicCity defaults can account for
at least some portion of that subgroup's behavior, the hypothesis
that users share their content to rebel against copyright holders or
copyright laws provides an unconvincing explanation for the be-
havior of most file-sharers.
A related alternative explanation views uploading copyrighted
content as an expressive act. Under this theory, explaining why
anonymous individuals make their content available to other
anonymous individuals on the network is no more difficult than
explaining why hundreds of thousands of people have created per-
sonalized web pages that can be viewed by other web surfers, or
why tens of thousands of teenagers feel the need to blast their fa-
vorite music from the speakers of their automobiles or dorm
rooms. Certainly, people will engage in those types of expressive
activities even in the absence of economic incentives to do so.
While this expressive theory explanation probably explains the
conduct of a few file-sharers, there are several reasons why it pro-
vides a relatively unsatisfying explanation for why the vast majority
of file-sharers behave as they do. First, file-swappers are quite ca-
pable of discerning which sound recordings are widely available on
the networks, and which are in short supply. If the expressive ex-
planation accounted for most of their cooperation, then one would
expect file-sharers to fill their shared directories with music by
more obscure artists whose works are difficult to obtain on the
networks."8 As it happens, users do precisely the opposite. A com-
sound recordings shared their files at almost precisely the same rates and levels as
those who downloaded English language sound recordings. Sixty-four percent of
those downloading Spanish language songs shared files, versus sixty-nine percent for
all other music downloaders. These results suggest that file-sharing is not driven by
any peculiar attributes of Anglo-American culture. That said, some caution is in order
in interpreting this data in light of the small sample size (thirty-nine downloads of
Spanish language music), and the increasing, albeit still limited, popularity of Spanish
lanuage music among those who speak only English.
See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
22My account presumes that users do not derive much expressive value from
anonymously mimicking their peers' mainstream expressions.
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mon complaint among network users is that popular, mainstream
music is vastly overrepresented on the networks and more cutting
edge music is too hard to find.229 A review of users' shared directo-
ries confirms this phenomenon, revealing that the overwhelming
majority of listeners are content to share yet another copy of an al-
ready widely available Jennifer Lopez or Britney Spears song,
rather than files by artists who have small but deeply dedicated fol-
lowings. If the expressive theory really explains why people share,
then one would expect to find a very different mix of files available
for downloading.
Second, unlike most instances of expressive activity, the type of
expression that occurs on the file-swapping networks is completely
anonymous. So while an individual's web page almost always con-
tains an email address that allows a user browsing the Internet to
contact the publisher, the expressive activity that occurs on Ka-
zaa/MusicCity or Gnutella is not conducive to such contact or asso-
ciation between the publisher and the matter published.3
Third, there is a cross-cutting motivation that may dampen the
impulse to reciprocate. By making a particular artist's content
available for downloading, a user who enjoys that artist's work is
both disseminating the artist's work and potentially depriving that
artist of revenue. A network user who adores a particular artist
may therefore view placing that artist's work in his shared direc-
tory as an imperfect avenue for "spreading the gospel" about his
favorite musician.
29 See Asvanund et al., supra note 210, at 12 (noting that "song availability was very
low for a random selection of songs from all artists" on the OpenNap P2P network);
cf. Eric Boehlert, Napster Sound Bite: Feelin' Groovy, Salon.com, at
http://dir.salon.com/business/feature/2000/06/19/napsterlog/index.html (June 19, 2000)
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (providing examples of popular
musical hits downloaded by Napster's own executives).
Kazaa and the latest Limewire application both permit users to chat with other
users, so some contact might occur with "publishers." Notably, significant numbers of
network users appear to disable the chat function, precluding other users from con-
tacting them. During my study of Kazaa, which entailed scores of hours spent online,
only one other user attempted to chat with me.
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IV. UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING THE FILE-SWAPPING
MOVEMENT
Having introduced a theoretical framework and discussed the
ways in which the file-swapping movement and file-sharing senti-
ment emerged, it is worth exploring some practical implications.
This Part begins by analyzing the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit's
A & M Records. v. Napster, Inc. decision.23 ' Although the Napster
decision was successful in purely legal terms-it established clear
rules and largely resolved the dispute among the parties-it was
unsuccessful in two respects: It evidently failed to rally the public
around the cause of combating copyright infringement on the
Internet; and it ultimately diverted Napster users to other file-
swapping networks without making them second-guess the moral-
ity of their actions. This Part then explores alternative strategies
for addressing the societal and economic changes that Napster and
its successors have introduced.
A. Napster and the Failure of Law as an Expressivist Tool
On February 12, 2001, when the Ninth Circuit handed down the
Napster decision, the court had a significant opportunity to per-
suade the public about the immorality of file-swapping. The deci-
sion had been eagerly anticipated for months, received enormous
media attention, and its consequences would be felt immediately.
Although the Ninth Circuit decisively rejected the legal arguments
put forward by Napster's attorneys,232 the opinion evidently did lit-
tle to stem widespread participation in the networks. To the con-
trary, the haphazard way in which the decision dealt with injunctive
remedies may well have done more collective good than harm to
the networks. Two years after the court's ruling, file-swapping is as
widespread and prominent as ever. 33 While the court's ruling may
alter social norms in the long run, the early evidence should en-
courage supporters of file-swapping. What accounts for the ap-
parent failure of the Napster decision to alter users' behavior?
231239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
212 See id. at 1024-27.
233 See supra text accompanying note 4.
234 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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1. The Importance of the Injunction
While the Napster court devoted barely two pages of its opinion
to questions involving the scope of the injunction, it was this aspect
of the opinion, rather than its primary holding, that was most im-
portant in setting the tone for the events that followed.235
After ruling that Napster had been guilty of contributory copy-
right infringement and that Napster's users were themselves en-
gaged in copyright infringement,236 the Ninth Circuit elected to ex-
ercise restraint at the remedial stage. The court first faulted the
district court for improperly allocating the burdens of ensuring
copyright compliance.237 It then remanded the case to the district
court for a reassessment of the proper remedies."' The decision to
remand effectively stayed injunctive relief until the district court
could rule. Three weeks passed before the district court finally
ruled on the scope of the injunction. Under the revised injunction,
record labels would be held responsible for informing Napster of
the artists and song titles to which they held copyrights. Upon re-
ceiving notice of a particular copyrighted file, Napster would be
given three business days to remove that and all identical files from
its directory.39
As a result of this delay in the enforcement of the Napster in-
junction, several weeks passed before users observed a tangible dif-
ference in the quantity of copyrighted files available on the system.
As one might imagine, the publicity generated by the Ninth Cir-
cuit's ruling brought millions of users to Napster's web site. Some
were old-timers seeking a last opportunity to stock up on files; oth-
235 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027-28.
236 See id. at 1014--22.
237 Id. at 1027.
238 Id. at 1029. As per usual Ninth Circuit practice, the court's mandate was withheld
pending an application for rehearing en banc. In extraordinary cases-such as Nap-
ster-the court has the option of having its mandate issue immediately. See Fed. R.
App. P. 41(b); see also 9th Cir. R. 41-1 advisory committee's note ("Only in excep-
tional circumstances will a panel order the mandate to issue immediately upon the
filing of a disposition. Such circumstances include cases.., where an emergency situa-
tion requires that the action of the Court become final and mandate issue at once.").
239A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6243, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2000).
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ers were newcomers who wanted to see firsthand the application
that had generated so much controversy. "'
2. The Porous Filter
Millions of users logged in to the Napster network and, for sev-
eral weeks, saw that virtually nothing had changed. The courts had
declared file-swapping illegal, yet file-swapping proceeded at a re-
cord pace. Recall that part of what made Napster such a seductive
network is that it advertised and magnified noncompliance with
copyright laws. 4' On Napster, users easily learned what content in-
dividual users had and what those users were downloading. Nap-
ster users logged on to the system in the wake of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's ruling and witnessed massive noncompliance with the spirit
of the court's order. Indeed, even the filtering system that Napster
installed pursuant to the court's order was quickly thwarted by not-
so-clever coding systems (for example, the Beatles became the
"eatlesBe," "zBeatles," the "Fab Four," "John, Paul, George, and
Ringo," etc.).4 2 Witnessing thousands of other users' attempts to
circumvent the injunction only fortified Napster users' resolve. The
obvious noncompliance with the law and with the spirit of the
court's injunction encouraged other users to ignore the law and
disregard the injunction. Just as behavioral cascades can occur in
the reciprocity context, flouting of the law can also be self-
reinforcing.
3. The Clearinghouse for Napster Alternatives
In some sense, the continued circumvention of Napster's copy-
right filtering mechanisms was the least of the recording industry's
worries. Immediately after the Napster decision, Napster users
thronged to the online Napster discussion forum, where they dis-
240 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
241 See supra Section III.B.
242 See P.J. Huffstutter, Users Outwit Napster's Effort to Block Copyrighted Songs,
L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 2001, at C1 ("Fans are also flocking to 'translator' Web sites,
where they can type in the name of an artist or a song title and learn what permuta-
tions are being used on Napster."); Graziano & Rainie, supra note 19, at 3 ("[U]sers
give multiple titles to individual songs, in some cases, in apparently deliberate at-
tempts to ensure popular songs are not recognized by Napster's copyrighted-song
sniffing system.").
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cussed not only various methods of getting around Napster's
screening software, but also alternative file-swapping applications
they would use in the event of Napster's ultimate downfall.243 Vari-
ous options, such as BearShare or AudioGalaxy Satellite, were
promoted feverishly, and users were directed to the many Napster
alternative applications available on download.com. Napster's
parting blow to the record industry was therefore a decisive one:
Users who still adhered to the file-swapping norms espoused by
Napster used Napster itself as a forum for promoting alternative
file-swapping networks.
Copyright holders were at least partially to blame for this post-
injunction use of Napster. The Napster plaintiffs did not seek an in-
junction covering chat rooms or message boards on Napster,2" pre-
sumably based on concerns that such an injunction might not with-
stand First Amendment scrutiny.2 45 Because the injunction never
243 See Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, When Good Value Chains Go Bad:
The Economics of Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement, 52 Hastings L.J. 961,
979 (2001) (observing that the recording companies alleged that Napster allowed its
electronic bulletin boards to be used to disseminate information on renaming conven-
tions).
24A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 917 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
245 Had Napster been forced to take its web site offline temporarily pursuant to the
court's injunction, it likely would have censored any discussion of Napster alternatives
in its forums upon the service's re-launch. After all, the discussion of Napster alterna-
tives that occurred in those forums spurred many of Napster's users to switch to other
services, so it was hardly in Napster's commercial interest to permit such discussions
in its own forums.
Whether a court could have directed Napster to shut down its forums pursuant to a
preliminary injunction presents difficult constitutional questions. Such injunctive re-
lief would necessarily constitute state action implicating the First Amendment. The
propriety of restricting communications in those forums, however, would largely de-
pend on the means by which a court would analyze the communications and relief at
issue. On the one hand, the mere posting of the Internet addresses associated with al-
ternative file-swapping sites is arguably nonspeech that can be regulated without im-
plicating the First Amendment. Compare Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 447-49, 451-53 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that decryption software code is speech,
but that it also contains "nonspeech components" and therefore can be restricted
more severely by government than traditional speech), and Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d
481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that posting software source code on the Internet is
protected speech), with Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573,
585 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a top level Internet domain name is not speech, but
that lengthier domain names may be speech), and Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotect-
ing Code? Thoughts on First-Generation Internet Law, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1287,
1290-93 (2000) (criticizing Junger and arguing that source code generally is not pro-
tected speech). See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
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applied to these forums, the recording industry could do nothing
while the chat rooms and message boards became communications
hubs for those seeking to undermine the spirit of the court's ruling.
4. The Youth Vanguard
It is likely that the high visibility of successful screening circum-
vention on Napster made a particularly profound impression on
younger Napster users. These are the users who were most com-
mitted to the morality of unauthorized downloading and most
likely to engage in such behavior prior to the issuance of the in-
junction.24 At the time of the Ninth Circuit's injunction, the file-
swapping communities were particularly attractive to young com-
puter users. Teenagers like Shawn Fanning and Justin Frankel had
become role models for younger peers."7
For younger Internet users, the rebelliousness embodied in the
various efforts to circumvent the Napster injunction undoubtedly
(1978) ("Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated
without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about
securities, corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production informa-
tion among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities
of employees. Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power
to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity.") (citations omitted). Alternatively, a court might hold
that because a restriction on speech is necessary to avoid the thwarting of the court's
order regarding remedies, such a restriction withstands First Amendment scrutiny. Cf.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (holding that the First Amend-
ment does not bar courts from issuing protective orders to prevent others from
publishing information obtained through pre-trial discovery).
On the other hand, one can argue persuasively that the speech that occurred in
Napster's forums should be analyzed as commercial speech or even political speech.
To the extent that users of other file-swapping networks were urging Napster users to
join them, such speech might constitute commercial speech, albeit speech not moti-
vated by a blatant profit motive. If so categorized, the arguably unlawful nature of the
commercial transaction being proposed might give the government significant leeway
to restrict speech promoting it. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). Yet, at least some of the discussion that oc-
curred in Napster's forum was classic political speech-such as speech by those seek-
ing to organize Napster users to contact Congress to express their disapproval of the
court's actions. If a court felt that such political speech was significant and that en-
couraging some speech was at least part of the purpose behind Napster's creation of
the forum, it would be quite reluctant to restrict speech therein.
246 See supra note 114.
247 Frankel was nineteen when he began working on MP3 technologies in 1996. Al-
derman, supra note 29, at 55.
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proved quite attractive.248 Noncompliance with the law became
glamorous, and circumventing the law became a kind of game.
Whatever political capital the Ninth Circuit and the agents of copy-
right enforcement had with the adult public, these institutions
would receive little deference from younger users who had cut
their teeth in the era of free music. 249 Because the law and the fed-
eral judges who interpreted it commanded less respect among
teenagers than among the public at large, the Ninth Circuit could
not tap into a base of goodwill among many Napster users. Those
teenagers and college students who disregarded the Ninth Circuit's
decision were valorized as courageous, not dismissed as scofflaws.
Teenagers understandably had little fear of facing legal repercus-
sions for their actions, ' and all the social incentives pointed to-
ward circumventing the newly announced law. Peer pressure and
peer-to-peer norms were perfectly aligned."'
The teenagers who playfully flouted the Ninth Circuit's injunc-
tion in the first weeks after its ruling and ultimately moved on to
other file-swapping sites when the injunction was tightened un-
doubtedly drew a number of conclusions from the experience. On
248See generally Gary Schwartz & Don Merten, The Language of Adolescence: An
Anthropological Approach to the Youth Culture, 72 Am. J. Soc. 453, 458 (1967) (dis-
cussing the prevalence of rebelliousness as an admired quality among youth).
249 See Ellickson, supra note 135, at 40.
20 Teenagers are essentially judgment proof, so the record labels would have little
incentive to pursue them. In 2001, the sound recording industry began pressuring
Internet Service Providers to terminate the accounts of copyright infringing users.
This type of threat-potentially depriving users of something they value-may be ef-
fective. See Amy Harmon, Internet Services Must Help Fight Online Movie Pirates,
Studios Say, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2001, at C4; John Borland, File-Trading Pressure
Mounts on ISPs, CNet News, at http://news.com.com/2100-1033-270568.html (July 25,
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Copyright holders can also
deter teenagers in other ways-for example, by getting them into trouble with their
parents or schools.
The large number of teenaged copyright infringers and the lack of public support
for prosecutions of file swappers make legal sanctions an unattractive tool for regulat-
ing behavior. In this vein, Tom Tyler has argued forcefully that the threat of sanctions
is an ineffective deterrent against unlawful behavior in general, and that this is par-
ticularly true in the intellectual property context, where the chances of an individual
infringer being punished are quite remote. See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intel-
lectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 219,
223-24 (1997).
251 See also Tyler, supra note 250, at 225 (arguing that peer disapproval is an impor-
tant element in determining whether individuals comply with the law).
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the basis of the injunction-circumvention experience, many of
these teenagers have been socialized to believe that the copyright
laws and the courts are largely ineffectual, and that noncompliance
with the spirit of the law is socially acceptable. Through their expo-
sure to a system in which the law says one thing, but everybody
does the opposite, they may well have developed enduring atti-
tudes toward intellectual property laws.252
5. The Injunction in Retrospect
Today, it is fair to say that Napster was brought to its knees by
the Ninth Circuit's injunction. 253 The movement that Napster
spawned, however, is alive and well. The few weeks following the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Napster was a critical period. The decision
itself galvanized file-swappers and, for a brief period, generated
enormous free publicity for file-swapping applications. The porous
Napster injunction emboldened hackers and users alike, convincing
them that while the courts could deal a setback to the file-swapping
movement, the government could never eradicate it.
B. The Self-Help Strategy
The RIAA succeeded in convincing the Ninth Circuit to set an
important pro-copyright precedent in Napster, just as it had suc-
ceeded in persuading Congress to enact aggressively pro-copyright
laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.254 While it
seems likely that the recording industry will be able to continue
this success against some of the hybrids that have emerged in the
wake of Napster's downfall, the Gnutella network presents the la-
bels with a serious conundrum. They may have to pursue legal ac-
252 See Michael X. Delli Carpini, Stability and Change in American Politics: The
Coming of Age of the Generation of the 1960s, at 9 (1986). Social norms can migrate
from the Internet to society at large. See Major, supra note 108, at 90. Ergo, it seems
possible that file-swappers' disrespect for intellectual property laws in cyberspace will
carry over toward their attitudes about intellectual property laws in general. This logic
suggests, for example, that plaintiffs in patent infringement cases might confront less
sympathetic jury pools in the coming years.
213 See Matt Richtel, Turmoil at Napster Moves the Service Closer to the Day the
Music Dies, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2002, at Cl.
"A 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). For a discussion of Napster's status under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, see John W. Belknap, Recent Developments, Copyright
Law and Napster, 5 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 183, 193-200 (2001).
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tions against individual music listeners or politically powerful
Internet Service Providers if they are to clamp down on illicit file-
swapping effectively. The future for the recording industry por-
tends significant legal costs as well as bruising public relations bat-
tles, as the industry confronts an environment in which a significant
percentage of the public is evidently skeptical of the need for copy-
right protection of MP3s.
Given this rather unappealing scenario, it is somewhat surprising
that the recording industry has only recently begun to pursue ex-
tra-legal strategies to deal with the file-swapping networks. A few
self-help strategies are discussed below."'
1. Uploading Inferior or Incomplete Copies
As discussed above, the greatest assets that the file-swapping
networks possess are their ever-improving technologies and the
widespread, accumulated trust among members within the net-
work. The technology will only continue to improve as time passes,
but the trust is vulnerable. Had the RIAA devoted its resources to
hiring saboteurs rather than investigators and attorneys, it might
have undermined confidence in file-swapping during the important
time period when the technology was developing a critical mass of
users. While it would have been easier to do so when the networks
were in their embryonic stages, a committed group of several
dozen mischievous uploaders might still wreak havoc on the
Gnutella or hybrid networks. After all, a tiny segment of the file-
sharing community is responsible for creating and uploading the
vast majority of the content appearing on the network, so a small
group of hyperactive uploaders could accomplish a great deal.
Doug Lichtman and David Jacobson suggested in 2000 that the
RIAA could launch an effective counterattack against file-
swapping by creating a large number of MP3 files that are the same
size and share the same titles as widely circulated copyrighted files
that are swapped over the network.256 This could be accomplished
255 A brief discussion of encryption as a self-help strategy against file-swapping net-
works can be found in Gilbert & Katz, supra note 243, at 974-75, 980.
256 Doug Lichtman & David Jacobson, Anonymity a Double-Edged Sword for Pi-
rates Online, Chi. Trib., Apr. 13, 2000, at N25; see also Ramayya Krishnan et al., The
Economics of Peer-to-Peer Networks 9 (Carnegie Mellon Univ. H. John Heinz Sch. of
Pub. Policy and Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2002-34, Aug. 2002), available at
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rather easily. The RIAA versions, however, would be flawed in
one of several respects: They might contain annoying pops,
screeches, skips, and buzzes throughout the record; alternatively,
the songs might be interspersed with public service announcements
about the importance of respecting copyright laws.
Two years after Lichtman and Jacobson proposed the idea, the
RIAA apparently began using such a strategy. In June of 2002,
three of the major record labels began "deluging popular services
like Morpheus, Kazaa and Grokster with thousands of decoy music
files that look identical to a sought-after song, but are filled with
long minutes of silence-or 30-second loops of a song's chorus.,
257
While some avid file-swappers posting in a Gnutella forum report
not having come across any such files since they were released, a
large percentage expressed significant annoyance at having come
across the files and began brainstorming ways in which the re-
cording industry's efforts might be thwarted.25 This apparent
RIAA strategy coincides with the introduction of controversial leg-
islation in Congress that would authorize copyright holders to em-
ploy technology-based, anti-infringement measures against the file-
swapping networks and their users.259
Because most users who upload MP3 files have their defaults set
to make those files they have just downloaded available for
download by others, the faulty files have spread quickly beyond the
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/detail.jsp?id=4252 (proposing that the RIAA
flood the file-swapping networks with thousands of flawed sound recordings). The
rock group Barenaked Ladies has adopted this strategy, but did so openly, and on a
very small scale. See Bev Wake, Canadian Band Gets Last Laugh in MP3 Fight:
'Sneaky' Barenaked Ladies Dupe Online Music Pirates, Ottawa Citizen, Sept. 22,
2000, at A8.
257 Dawn C. Chmielewski, Labels Open New Fire on Piracy: Barrage of Decoy Mu-
sic Aims at Online Services, San Jose Mercury News, June 28, 2002, available at 2002
WL 21858536; see also Nick Wingfield, Behind the Fake Music: Record Industry
Plants Decoys to Foil Fans of Free Web Tunes; A Decoy for Sheryl Crow, Wall St. J.,
July 11, 2002, at D1 (discussing the recording industry's tactic of planting decoy songs
on file-sharing services).
211See Gnutella News Forum, Spoof Files on P2P Networks? Tell Us!, at
http://www.gnutellanews.com/article/5015 (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with the
Virginia Law Review Association) (displaying postings of various users).
259A Bill to Amend Title 17, United States Code, to Limit the Liability of Copyright
Owners for Protecting Their Works on Peer-to-Peer Networks, H.R. 5211, 107th
Cong. (2002); See Teresa Wiltz, Music Debate Heads to the Hill, Wash. Post, Aug. 21,
2002, at A8.
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RIAA's computers. The increased prevalence of these files on the
network has increased the effective cost of obtaining "free music."
The minority of users who share files indiscriminately might re-
spond to this development by changing their default settings so
that only those files they have listened to would be available for
downloading. If many users took this step, the availability of files
on the networks would decline noticeably. That said, revealing it-
self to be the creator of these files was a strategic blunder by the
RIAA. By making no secret of its involvement, the RIAA ensured
that the frustration of file-swappers would be directed at it alone.
Had the RIAA put its plan into practice surreptitiously, it might
have successfully pitted the file-swappers against each other, since
some ordinary users would falsely suspect fellow users of having in-
tentionally spread the corrupted copies. If users of the peer-to-peer
networks began having adverse experiences with greater regularity
and did not have a solitary, unsympathetic target for their anger,
there could have been a cascade of animosity reverberating
through the networks.
Theories of reciprocity suggest that while increasing the cost of
uploading will result in fewer downloads, framing file-swappers for
the "crime" of passing along tainted files would cause far greater
long-term damage to the networks. I have argued that file-sharing
exists on these networks because some segment of the user popula-
tion determines that making their files available to the entire user
population is a good substitute for repaying those from whom they
have downloaded files. But this presupposes that file-swappers ac-
tually feel indebted to those who have provided them with content.
If covert actions by the RIAA caused file-swappers to feel angry
with those who had provided them with content, the reciprocal
chain motivating their cooperation would have broken.2"
2. Mischievous Misidentification
The self-help strategies need not be limited to providing users
with inferior copies of content they actually desire. An even more
"Indeed, if reciprocity runs in both directions, then file-swappers may decide to
retaliate against the uploader by intentionally making the flawed file available to
other downloaders. In that sense, a norm of cooperation might degenerate into a
norm of feuding and revenge.
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mischievous strategy would misidentify certain relatively undesir-
able songs as popular songs. For example, by labeling various
polka melodies as Britney Spears hits and distributing Mongolian
throat singing MP3s as popular Celine Dion vocals, a few dozen
mischievous uploaders could quickly undermine the trust that thus
far has characterized the file-swapping networks. Once again, these
uploaders would only need to distribute the misidentified copies on
the Internet every so often and could count on unsuspecting users
to spread those copies further.
3. Potential Drawbacks
The RIAA might well be concerned about "sinking to Gnutella's
level" by attempting a self-help approach. Yet, it is not at all clear
that this is a well-founded concern. The RIAA's actions in creating
spoof files were widely reported, but hardly editorialized. Newspa-
per coverage has been generally neutral,261 and while file-swappers
themselves have been angered by the moves, there is no evidence
that music listeners generally have changed their views about the
record labels or copyright laws as a result of these efforts. Those
Gnutella users who have complained about the flawed MP3 files
will likely find an unsympathetic audience outside the network
since they assumed the risk of imperfection when they tried to ob-
tain copyrighted materials for free.
A more sensible cause for concern among recording industry ex-
ecutives is that the file-swapping networks would be able to com-
bat misidentified or flawed file uploads through various technologi-
cal innovations. Indeed, by introducing an eBay-like technology262
that allowed its users to rate a particular file's quality, the Kazaa
network attempted to put such an infrastructure in place. On Ka-
zaa, however, such a rating system required a user to report on the
quality of the downloaded file. Because doing this was cumber-
261 See sources cited supra note 257.
262 See Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. Rev.
457, 471 (2001); Feedback Forum, at http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describ-
ing the "Feedback Profile" that every eBay user develops based upon comments from
other users).
263 See Integrity Rating, at http://www.kazaa.com/us/help/glossary/ratings.htm (last
visited Jan. 19, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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some, I observed relatively few users employing it. What works on
eBay when an auction participant must rate a handful of buyers or
sellers will not work as well on a file-swapping network, where a
typical user might engage in dozens of transactions during a single
day. Less cumbersome ratings systems conceivably might be intro-
duced in response to a serious mislabeling threat, but only after
some time had elapsed. It may well be that the recording industry
could develop technologies that would leapfrog whatever protec-
tions the file-swapping programmers invented. " The recording in-
dustry does not need to prevent all file-swapping; it only needs to
make file-sharing more difficult and less attractive."'
C. Taxing Uploading
Charismatic code has helped trigger a cooperative cascade on
peer-to-peer networks, but it has its limits. The cost of uploading is
minimal for many users, so they can be convinced to behave altru-
istically. Of course, the cost of uploading need not be minimal.
Students receive free high-speed Internet access at many universi-
ties. Subscribers to DSL and cable modem services generally pay a
flat monthly fee rather than paying for bandwidth based on usage.
As an increasing number of file-swappers obtain these high-speed
connections, they are able to upload files more rapidly and without
slowing their downloading times appreciably. In Europe, by con-
trast, flat-rate schemes have been rejected as a pricing model
among residential Internet subscribers.266
The copyright industries enjoy the benefit of a sympathetic Con-
gress and sympathetic courts, but they lack the popular support to
enforce criminal or significant civil penalties against file-swappers.
The copyright industries' various attempts to enforce their copy-
rights via what Dan Kahan calls "hard shoves" have been largely
unsuccessful because of the lack of public support for harsh sanc-
" See Lessig, supra note 108, at 129-30. Lessig has argued that trusted systems ul-
timately may become a technological fix for copyright infringement. See id. at 130.
Lessig, perhaps because he was writing in a pre-Gnutella era, uncharacteristically un-
derestimates the possibilities for hackers to spread, via the Internet, innovative tools
for circumventing trusted systems.
265 See id. at 57.
266 Litan, supra note 48, at 1076.
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tions against individual copyright infringers.67 And because there is
not a strong social norm against either downloading or uploading,
shame sanctions that try to target file-swappers are unlikely to
work: There would be little or no shame accompanying a public
identification of an individual as a file-swapper. In order to create a
moral consensus that supports the copyright status of sound re-
cordings, the copyright industries therefore may wish to explore
less punitive strategies.
Perhaps the most effective "gentle nudge" that copyright holders
could employ would be to convince Congress to enact a regulation
on Internet Service Providers banning flat-fee pricing on uploads
by residential customers."' Residential Internet Service Providers
based in the United States, whether commercial providers or uni-
versities, could be required by law to charge users incrementally
for every upload based on the amount of data transferred.269 This
fee need not be high. A charge of one dollar per 50,000 kilobytes
would easily do the trick, especially in deterring students.' Indeed,
as Clay Skirky notes, "Napster not only takes advantage of low
marginal costs, it couldn't work without them. Imagine how few
people would use Napster if it cost them even a penny every time
someone else copied a song from them."27' Alternatively, the fed-
eral government could tax such uploads directly, and collect
through the Internet Service Providers.
The introduction of such a charge on residential uploading
would constitute a self-enforcing effort to shut off the flow of free
267Kahan describes a "hard shove" as a law that severely condemns behavior, and a
"gentle nudge" as a law that encourages the desired behavior without forcing it down
the throats of an unsympathetic public. Kahan, supra note 121, at 609.
26 For a general discussion of the potential for regulating user conduct via Internet
Service Providers, see Katyal, supra note 120, at 1095-1101.
269 If the law also governed business customers, it would be more difficult to circum-
vent, but political opposition would likely be fierce. Companies that distribute soft-
ware applications, upgrades, or web content over the Internet could see their costs of
doing business skyrocket. Moreover, it would raise the cost of the copyright indus-
tries' efforts to sell their content to end users.
270 Under such a charging scheme it would cost approximately ten cents to upload
the average song in MP3 format and a little over one dollar to upload the average al-
bum (for example, The Beatles' Magical Mystery Tour, which is 51,771 kilobytes).
271 Shirky, supra note 7, at 33.
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content that has made the file-swapping networks possible.22 Copy-
right holders would be recognizing that they could neither stop
Internet users from visiting file-swapping sites nor adequately de-
ter them from infringing copyrights through those sites. Instead,
this pricing regime would alter the incentives sufficiently so that
those users living in the United States could no longer be con-
vinced to upload files by charismatic code or the change agents
who created it. As the continued prevalence of file transfer disrup-
tions on the file-swapping networks suggests, there are limits to the
kinds of sacrifices that users will make for the benefit of anony-
mous fellow users, even in the face of charismatic code's attempts
to instill a cooperative norm of reciprocity.273 If the pricing scheme
governing uploads were altered, sharing content would no longer
be an almost costless virtue for users on the file-swapping network.
Such a regulation would expose the limits of people's willingness to
be kind to strangers.
An incremental charging scheme will of course be overinclusive.
Professors who wish to share their own writings with others would
face increased costs, as would rappers trying to build their audi-
ences by giving away content, and family members sending digital
photographs over the Internet. In that sense, the Internet would
look less like a free network for exchanging information and more
like a parcel post system, where the cost of transmitting material
depends on the amount of material sent. Such an alteration of the
nature of the Internet could eviscerate much of what makes it such
an attractive tool for democratic self-expression and decentralized
debate, among other things.7 Reasonable people may well con-
clude that the tradeoffs involved exceed any anti-infringement
272 My reciprocity analysis suggests that such a change in the pricing regime would
increase the intensity of indebtedness feelings when an individual did successfully
download a file from a domestic file-sharer. I suspect, however, that most people
would find ways other than making their own files available to alleviate their guilt af-
ter such a transaction. Perhaps an instant messaging thank you note would do the
trick. Alternatively, it might make the cost of sharing so high and so obvious that
downloaders would be deterred from acquiring content from uploaders in the first
place. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 182, at 262 (noting that people are particularly reluctant
to seek help from strangers, but not from friends, when the costs of helping are high).
273 See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
274 See Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 337,
341-43 (2000).
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benefits.275 That said, it is worth underscoring that peer-to-peer file-
sharers will be far more sensitive to price than their photograph
swapping counterparts. People have demonstrated a willingness to
pay incremental fees to share reprints with colleagues or photo-
graphs with loved ones, but a peer-to-peer network that charges
users for the "privilege" of sharing their copyrighted content with
anonymous strangers is unlikely to succeed. Thus, in this instance
where legitimate uses of a network are far less sensitive to price
than illegitimate uses, a somewhat overinclusive marginal pricing
mechanism may well be net socially beneficial.
D. The Power of Information and Un-Charismatic Code
Perhaps the copyright industries will conclude that the threat to
their revenues does not justify arguably extreme measures such as
self-help or incremental taxes on uploading. If copyright holders
still wish to combat copyright infringement, but wish to do so via
less controversial means, they might mount a new sort of public re-
lations campaign. So far, the copyright industries' propaganda ef-
forts have been largely limited to educating the public-and stu-
dents in particular-about the importance of respecting intellectual
property.276 By and large, these efforts have failed to sway popular
sentiment. Users have continued to engage in file-swapping and
file-sharing despite these campaigns, and despite Napster's holding
that such activities amount to copyright infringement. At the pre-
sent time, it appears that it will be quite difficult for the copyright
industries to alter the perception that participation in these net-
works is morally acceptable.
The copyright industries, however, might be able to weaken file-
sharing through a less ambitious education campaign. The charis-
matic code hypothesis suggests that if cooperative behavior is mag-
275 Alternatively, policymakers might craft a better tailored scheme that would make
refunds available to those individuals who could prove to a non-governmental third
party payer that they had uploaded public domain materials or had a license to share
their content. Consumers could then permit these third parties to audit their Internet
transactions to ensure that their uploads were indeed authorized as a condition for
participation in the refund regime.
276 See Recording Industry Association of America, Anti-Piracy: Education, Innova-
tion and Enforcement, at http://www.riaa.org/protect-online-3.cfm (last visited Nov.
16, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discussing the RIAA
Soundbyting education campaign).
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nified and uncooperative behavior is masked, then members of a
community are more likely to cooperate. If the copyright industries
could somehow magnify noncooperative behavior and mask coop-
erative behavior, they should be able to undermine cooperation
and perhaps even trigger a cascade of noncooperative behavior.
How might these goals be accomplished?
One strategy would be for the copyright industries to publicize
statistics that reflect actual rates of sharing on the file-swapping
networks. For example, the Adar and Huberman study's finding
that two-thirds of all Gnutella users share no files presents a dam-
aging counterpoint to the impression of widespread file-sharing
that is presented by Gnutella's charismatic code. Particularly if fol-
low-up work reveals that Gnutella's rates of file-sharing have not
increased significantly in the time since Adar and Huberman col-
lected their data, the copyright industries could devote resources to
convincing Gnutella users that a norm of free-riding exists on
Gnutella. If Gnutella's users believe this data-and that is a big
"if"--then that statistic could make file-sharing scarcer still. Of
course, if the Kazaa/MusicCity network (on which my data sug-
gests sharing is more common than free-riding) is typical of the hy-
brids, publicizing such data might not have a detrimental effect on
file-sharing rates.
A significant problem with such a simple education program is
that its message is unlikely to be internalized by the members of
the target audience. File-swappers may view any claims made by
the copyright industries or their surrogates as inherently suspect in
light of those industries' motives for causing people to believe that
there is a norm of free-riding.277 Moreover, even if people hear the
message that free-riding is the norm on Gnutella and believe it at
some level, if that message is inconsistent with the observed distor-
tion created by the charismatic code, then the statistic may seem
less "real" than the distortion.278
277 Cf. Perkins, supra note 213, at 198 ("If they are highly committed to their own
misperceptions, some students will be skeptical of results from campuswide polls
about substance use norms. This may be true of both problem users and other stu-
dents, who will explain discrepancies as the result of an odd sample, poor questions,
poor participation, and so forth.").
278 Cf. id. at 181 ("If people perceive situations as real, those situations are real in
their consequences. Subjective perceptions, be they accurate or inaccurate, must be
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An alternative "education" strategy might confront charismatic
code on its own terms. Given the open-source nature of the
Gnutella applications for file-swapping, the record labels are free
to create "patches" (or updates) to existing versions of Gnutella.
The recording industry might find it worthwhile to develop and dis-
tribute software patches that expose users to the many free-riders
on Gnutella and magnify the actions of those free-riders. For ex-
ample, the program might prominently identify free-riders and
those sharing very few files in response to search queries. Alterna-
tively, the patch might prominently gather and display real time
updates concerning the number of free-riders on the network and
the median number of files being shared. Similarly, the record la-
bels or their allies might release a Kazaa patch that either magni-
fies the extent of the free-riding on Kazaa, defaults users into free-
riding, or, as the Kazaa Lite application has already done, allows
free-riders to download files more efficiently than most file-
sharers.279 In order to convince file-swappers to download these
patches, the creators of these patches would need to create desir-
able improvements that enhance the experience of using these ap-
plications, and bundle these improvements with the un-charismatic
code elements. If such patches were widely disseminated, the re-
cording industry might effectively combat the distortion created by
charismatic code. By providing file-swappers with a more realistic
assessment of their peers or strengthening the appeal of free-
riding, the recording industry might well prompt file-swappers to
imitate the free-riding behavior that is still somewhat common on
these networks.
taken as important in their own right since people act on their perceptions in addition
to acting within a real world.") (citation omitted).
279 See supra note 173 (discussing Kazaa Lite and the way it undermines the effec-
tiveness of Kazaa's new "participation levels" feature). Kazaa Lite is an unauthorized
version of Kazaa's proprietary software. See Pete Rojas, Kazaa Lite: No Spyware Af-
tertaste, Wired News, at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,51916,00.html (Apr.
18, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Of course, as the defen-
dants in an RIAA lawsuit alleging massive copyright infringement, Kazaa's creators
are not in a particularly strong position to urge a crackdown on Kazaa Lite's in-
fringement of Kazaa's copyrights.
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E. Strengthening the File-Swapping Movement
The foregoing discussion presumes that the reader's orientation
is toward controlling copyright infringement. But one can use in-
sights about charismatic code and reciprocity to buttress the file-
swapping networks as well. Indeed, while the Napster court almost
certainly reached the proper result under existing copyright laws,
the wisdom of those laws is open to serious question. Those who
see file-swapping as a laudable effort to undermine an inefficient
copyright regime, subject to interest group capture, and irreconcil-
ably contrary to social norms regarding the appropriate use of me-
dia files, ought to be thinking about ways in which the applications'
code: can better tap into norms of reciprocity."
While the various file-swapping networks all employ some sort
of charismatic code with varying degrees of success, each applica-
tion could do a better job of encouraging uploading. For example,
in the past MusicCity allowed a user to peek at the shared direc-
tory of another user who was downloading from him. By making
such searches available, the software potentially permitted a user
to discover that some portion of those users who were download-
ing from him were not sharing with others. By disabling this fea-
ture, MusicCity could have rendered invisible those users who
were sharing no files. Alternatively, the software might identify
new users by using a particular color code or symbol during the us-
ers' first week of participation in the network. By doing so, the
network's creators would indicate to its membership that these
newer users, who were relatively unlikely to have amassed large
collections of MP3 files, were not being uncooperative, but had
merely not had a chance to engage in substantial sharing. In the
most recent version of Kazaa, the software creators have gone so
m As someone who is for the time being agnostic about the desirability of strong
versus weak copyright protections for sound recordings, I feel the most troubling as-
pect of the current regime is the stark conflict between copyright law and social norms
regarding the scope of noncommercial use of sound recordings. I would be inclined to
allow copyright holders and the governments sympathetic to them some time to
mount a campaign to alter social norms governing the use of MP3 files. But if those
efforts should fail because the message or messenger is unappealing, then I would fa-
vor amending the copyright laws to reflect popular attitudes.
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far as to provide uploading users with information about each
downloader's propensity to share. 8'
The networks might also begin showing users how their own
sharing can reverberate through the system. For example, the soft-
ware easily could be designed to track not only the number of up-
loads a particular user had provided, but the number of times the
copies he passed along had themselves been copied. Such informa-
tion would demonstrate to users that others were cooperating as
well by sharing the files they had acquired, and would also empha-
size that a single upload was likely to engender benefits for many
downstream users of the network.
CONCLUSION
The file-swapping networks present a fascinating case study for
those who study networks of illegality and technologies for intellec-
tual property infringement. A third group of scholars also ought to
be quite interested in studying file-swapping networks. These
scholars-the social norms theorists-examine instances in which
behavioral regularities arise among groups in response to social
pressures, especially when those regularities have little or no re-
semblance to formal law. In this instance, tens of millions of file-
swappers are behaving in ways that flout the nation's copyright
laws.
To date, the norms theorists have said little about the file-
swapping phenomenon. That silence stems in part from norms
theorists' understandable caution in moving beyond the realm of
close-knit groups. Yet, as social psychologists have demonstrated,
there are persuasive explanations for why one might see coopera-
tive behavior even in those environments where free-riding is easy,
repeat player interactions are rare, and anonymity is widespread.
The explanations are different, but they are no less compelling.
21 See supra note 173. Because a number of network users employ Kazaa Lite soft-
ware that misidentifies its users as maximally cooperative, the extent of sharing on
Kazaa is unintentionally magnified. In any event, given the propensity of most Kazaa
users to engage in small-scale sharing, in the absence of the Kazaa Lite distortion, one
could expect that Kazaa's new "participation levels" feature would discourage both
free-riding and large-scale sharing. Paradoxically, as an increasing number of Kazaa
users learn about Kazaa Lite's availability, the contributions made by actual large-
scale sharers will become blurred.
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As one who is sympathetic to the social norms perspective, but
cognizant of its present limitations, I have begun to explain how
these behavioral regularities might arise in loose-knit groups. My
Article suggests that in certain environments people may internal-
ize norms of conditional cooperation. It further suggests that com-
munity members' favorable perceptions of their peers can be self-
fulfilling, and that the file-swapping networks' creators have suc-
cessfully designed a world in which their members see each other
through rose-colored glasses. Charismatic code, which magnifies
cooperative behavior and masks uncooperative behavior, can be a
powerful tool for instituting a cooperative arrangement and solidi-
fying nascent cooperative norms. Although they are almost as
loose-knit a community as one can imagine, the file-swappers trad-
ing files on Gnutella and the hybrids have come to acquire some of
the cooperative attitudes and customs that one would ordinarily
expect to find in much closer-knit groups. Indeed, for many file-
swappers, reciprocal predilections easily trump any preference for
behaving lawfully.
The strategies that copyright holders have employed so far have
failed to reduce the prevalence of file-swapping. Copyright holders,
like legal scholars generally, have focused too much attention on
what the law should be with respect to copyright infringement via
the Internet and too little attention on understanding the powerful
motivations that have caused tens of millions of Americans to ig-
nore copyright laws. If norms, and not the law, are what motivate
consumers to act, then a wiser strategy for the RIAA and its allies
might be to think about ways in which they could weaken the co-
operative norms that have arisen among users of these networks.
Creators of copyrighted content should try to understand what
makes users cooperate with anonymous strangers. Once they have
figured that out, they might redirect their creativity toward devel-
oping strategies for undermining the substantial but vulnerable
trust that permeates these online communities. Because uploading,
not downloading, is the weak link in these file transfers, strategies
that weaken the impulse to upload are most likely to succeed.

